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Our Equity: Federalism and Chancery 
JEFFREY STEVEN GORDON* 
Federal courts sitting in diversity cannot agree on 
whether state or federal law governs the award of a prelim-
inary injunction. The conditions for the exercise of a federal 
diversity court’s extraordinary remedial power are any-
body’s guess. The immediate cause of the confusion is Jus-
tice Frankfurter’s cryptic opinion in Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
York, which aggressively enforced Erie and, at the same 
time, preserved the so-called “equitable remedial rights” 
doctrine. There are, however, much broader and deeper 
causes that explain why the equitable remedial rights doc-
trine is almost incomprehensible today. 
This Article argues that the early history of equity in the 
federal courts is a distinctive and untold story about equity’s 
interaction with judicial federalism. Conventionally, this is 
a tale of two equities: homogeneous equity, where federal 
courts apply uniform nonstate equity, and heterogeneous eq-
uity, where federal courts apply state equity. This Article 
demonstrates that homogeneous federal equity commenced 
in 1809, about a decade earlier than previously thought, and 
that there is a deep and unappreciated tension at the center 
of heterogeneous federal equity. 
The primary contribution of this Article is to recover a 
third federal equitable tradition, a middle ground between 
the extremes of homogeneity and heterogeneity. This third 
conception of federal equity—the facilitative conception—is 
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revealed by a close reading of federal equity cases before 
1809, a period to which equity scholars have paid scant at-
tention. The facilitative conception originated in the earliest 
years of the Republic, was sensitive to the legitimate inter-
ests and activities of the states, and contributed to the con-
struction of the early United States. Using a key supplied by 
the facilitative conception of federal equity, this Article pro-
poses a system of shifting presumptions to systematize and 
structure the equitable remedial rights doctrine. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Here is a simple question: should federal courts sitting in diver-
sity apply state or federal law when deciding whether to grant a pre-
liminary injunction?1 For decades, federal courts have split on this 
straightforward question about the application of Erie.2 Some courts 
apply federal law; others apply state law; and still others adopt a 
mixed approach.3 Scholars have tackled the problem head-on.4 But 
                                                                                                             
 1 The same question arises when federal courts exercise supplemental juris-
diction. In general, the question arises when a federal court enforces a state-cre-
ated right. My central concern is not about federal courts applying equity in public 
law to enforce federal constitutional or statutory imperatives against the states. 
 2 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See David Crump, The 
Twilight Zone of the Erie Doctrine: Is There Really a Different Choice of Equita-
ble Remedies in the “Court a Block Away”?, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1233, 1234–35 
(1991); John T. Cross, The Erie Doctrine in Equity, 60 LA. L. REV. 173, 190–91, 
228 (1999). 
 3 See infra Part V.A. 
 4 See generally Crump, supra note 2, at 1233–35; Cross, supra note 2, at 
190–91, 228. 
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a federal court in California noted the conflict almost fifty years 
ago,5 and today nothing has changed. 
Before Erie was decided in 1938, our simple question was 
among the easiest to answer. Because a preliminary injunction is an 
equitable remedy, federal law governed.6 At the time—shockingly, 
to our Erie-habituated instincts—federal courts across the nation en-
forced a uniform set of equitable doctrines and remedies, regulated 
under the Federal Equity Rules.7 Kristin Collins has shed some 
much-needed light on the equity side of the federal courts in the 
nineteenth century, concluding that “federal courts generally applied 
a uniform body of nonstate, judge-made equity principles.”8 Our 
question became much more difficult after Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
York reoriented federal equity to the states in 1945.9 Applying Erie, 
Justice Frankfurter overturned the homogeneous (uniform) concep-
tion of federal equity in favor of a heterogeneous (state-by-state) 
one.10 Federal diversity courts, even when sitting in equity, were to 
consider themselves “only another court of the State”11—although 
plainly this was an exaggeration.12 Frankfurter, however, included a 
vague caveat: “[t]his does not mean . . . that a federal court may not 
afford an equitable remedy not available in a State court.”13 It is the 
indeterminate scope of this caveat, known as the “equitable remedial 
rights” doctrine, that makes our simple question hard to answer.14 
                                                                                                             
 5 Kaiser Trading Co. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 321 F. Supp. 
923, 931 n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (“The courts are in conflict . . . as to whether state 
or federal law governs the issuance of an injunction.”). 
 6 See e.g., Breeden v. Lee, 4 F. Cas. 50, 51–52 (CC.E.D. Va. 1877) (No. 
1,828); Taylor v. Clark, 89 F. 7, 7–8 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1898); Davidson v. Calkins, 
92 F. 230, 232–36, (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1899). 
 7 See, e.g., Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1868). 
 8 Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Eq-
uity, and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 254 (2010) 
[hereinafter Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation]. 
 9 Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945). 
 10 See id. at 109–12. 
 11 Id. at 108. 
 12 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 13 Guar. Tr., 326 U.S. at 105. 
 14 See id. See generally Note, The Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine: Past 
and Present, 67 HARV. L. REV. 836, 836 (1954) [hereinafter Past and Present]; 
Comment, The Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine, 55 YALE L.J. 401, 414–15 
(1946) [hereinafter Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine]. 
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Our simple question is made even harder because it is only one 
instance of a more general problem: should federal courts sitting in 
diversity apply state or federal law when deciding whether to ad-
minister equitable relief? The answer matters because equitable 
remedies are powerful; indeed, “[t]he preliminary injunction may be 
the most striking remedy wielded by contemporary courts.”15 We 
need a sure guide for understanding what law governs equitable re-
lief when federal courts enforce state-created rights. This Article ar-
gues that neither the homogeneous nor heterogeneous conception of 
federal equity is up to the task. But there is another equitable tradi-
tion, a middle ground between the extremes of homogeneity and het-
erogeneity. This third conception of federal equity—which I’ll call 
the facilitative conception—provides a key for deciding whether to 
apply state or federal law when equitable relief is requested in a di-
versity case. Drawing on equity’s classic distinction between the ex-
clusive jurisdiction and the jurisdiction in aid of legal rights, the fa-
cilitative conception counsels that federal law presumptively gov-
erns only that equitable relief which merely facilitates or aids a final 
merits decision.16 The presumption is rebutted if the relief is func-
tionally equivalent to a final decision. On this view, federal law pre-
sumptively governs preliminary injunctions because they merely 
seek to minimize the risk of irreparable injury pending litigation on 
the merits.17 
The facilitative conception finds its origins in the federal courts 
at the turn of the nineteenth century.18 In the early years of the Re-
public, federal courts used equity to facilitate the commonsense im-
plementation of the first Judiciary Act,19 and to contribute to the 
construction of the early United States, in three distinct ways. First, 
equity ensured that aggrieved states could enforce in federal court 
legal claims deriving from their own statutes. Exercising original 
jurisdiction in 1792, the Supreme Court enjoined a circuit court’s 
                                                                                                             
 15 John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. 
REV. 525, 525 (1978). 
 16 See J.D. HEYDON ET AL., MEAGHER, GUMMOW AND LEHANE’S EQUITY: 
DOCTRINES & REMEDIES 11–12 (5th ed. 2015). 
 17 Leubsdorf, supra note 15, at 540–41 (“[T]he preliminary injunction stand-
ard should aim to minimize the probable irreparable loss of rights caused by errors 
incident to a hasty decision.”). 
 18 See infra Part IV. 
 19 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
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execution of a judgment at law because a state had no opportunity 
to enforce its statute.20 The injunction preserved the status quo while 
the Supreme Court determined the merits at common law.21 Second, 
the federal courts, worried about encroaching on state powers, de-
ployed equity to limit federal jurisdiction. For example, a circuit 
court dismissed a common law action where a plaintiff had fraudu-
lently manufactured diversity jurisdiction.22 The fraud was revealed 
after an equitable bill of discovery pierced the common law plead-
ings and revealed that the true plaintiff was nondiverse.23 Third, 
early federal equity courts sedulously applied state statutes, includ-
ing statutes of limitation.24 They adopted state court interpretations 
of limitation statutes, even if they thought that the state courts had 
got it wrong.25 A common theme of federal equity’s three interven-
tions is concern and regard for the role and status of the states in the 
early federalism. 
These different historical conceptions of federal equity (facilita-
tive, homogeneous, and heterogeneous) are not cleanly demarcated, 
hard-and-fast categories. They are useful devices for describing fed-
eral equity’s function and historical progression. The facilitative and 
homogeneous conceptions, for example, were manifestations of the 
general common law articulated by Justice Story in Swift v. Tyson.26 
Federal courts cited state, federal, and English cases to determine as 
best they could correct equitable doctrine. The differences between 
facilitative and homogeneous federal equity illustrate that we can be 
more precise in describing exactly what federal equity courts were 
doing under the Swift regime. 
This Article shows that the early history of equity in the federal 
courts is an untold story about equity’s interaction with American 
                                                                                                             
 20 Georgia v. Brailsford (Brailsford I), 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 405 (1792) (opin-
ion of Johnson, J.); id. at 405–06 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 21 Brailsford I, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 405 (opinion of Johnson, J.); id. at 407 
(opinion of Blair, J.); id. at 409 (opinion of Jay, C.J.); Georgia v. Brailsford 
(Brailsford II), 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415, 419 n.* (1793). 
 22 Maxfield’s Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 330, 331–36, 338, 16 F. Cas. 
1195 (C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (No. 9,321). 
 23 Id. at 330–33. 
 24 See, e.g., Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454, 456–58 (1806). 
 25 See, e.g., Higginson v. Mein, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 415, 419–20 (1808). 
 26 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842). 
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judicial federalism. The first contribution of this Article is an anal-
ysis of federal equity before 1809, a period to which equity scholars 
have paid scant attention. During this time, federal judges sitting in 
diversity applied federal equity in service of state interests, reflect-
ing a delicate federalist/antifederalist compromise.27 But the analy-
sis shows more than the federal courts administering a distinct vision 
of equity in the first two decades of the Republic. It also demon-
strates, drawing on Stephen Skowronek’s theory of state-building28 
and recent work on equity and administration,29 that this vision con-
tributed to the construction of the early American state. Unnoticed 
until now, early federal equity—which ensured the determination of 
state legal claims, guarded against the fraudulent expansion of fed-
eral jurisdiction, and deferred to state statutory interpretation30—fa-
cilitated the practical administration of the judiciary and reinforced 
the early American state of “courts and parties.”31 
The second contribution of this Article is to show that the Su-
preme Court, speaking via John Marshall, adopted a robust homo-
geneous equity almost ten years earlier than previously thought.32 It 
is a settled faith that the Supreme Court first established homogene-
ous federal equity in 1818.33 But nearly a decade earlier, two cases—
Bodley v. Taylor and Taylor v. Brown, both decided in 1809—speak 
the language of homogeneous federal equity, marking the transition 
from the facilitative conception to the homogeneous one.34 Scholars 
have overlooked the full import of these two cases. This Article an-
alyzes Bodley and Brown, and contextualizes Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s pronouncement that “[i]n all cases in which a court of equity 
                                                                                                             
 27 See infra Part IV. 
 28 See generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: 
THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 7–8 
(1982). 
 29 See generally EQUITY AND ADMINISTRATION (P. G. Turner ed., 2016). 
 30 See infra Part IV. 
 31 SKOWRONEK, supra note 28, at 23, 27–29. 
 32 See infra Part III.A. 
 33 See Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 222–23 (1818). 
 34 See Bodley v. Taylor, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 191, 222 (1809); Taylor v. Brown, 
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 234, 255 (1809). 
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takes jurisdiction, it will exercise that jurisdiction upon its own prin-
ciples.”35 
Third, this Article shows that equity is in deep tension with 
Erie.36 Scholars have highlighted the internal inconsistency of 
Guaranty Trust.37 On the one hand, Frankfurter’s opinion nominally 
reaffirmed the equitable remedial rights doctrine, which preserves a 
domain for independent federal equitable relief when enforcing 
state-created rights.38 But on the other hand, Frankfurter aggres-
sively enforced Erie in equity cases, saying that a federal court “can-
not afford recovery if the right to recover is made unavailable by the 
State nor can it substantially affect the enforcement of the right as 
given by the State.”39 In the result, Frankfurter resected over one 
hundred years of homogeneous federal equity, leaving federal diver-
sity courts with a chronically impoverished equitable remedial rights 
doctrine. This “considerable surgical operation,”40 which reduced 
federal equity in diversity cases to “the forms and mode of enforcing 
the [state-created] right,”41 “marked a significant—even seismic—
change.”42 
This Article argues that there is a tension between equity and 
Erie running deeper still. After Guaranty Trust, a federal equity 
court engages in a qualitatively different inquiry to its premerger 
counterpart. Today, federal diversity courts do not ascertain upon 
general reasoning and legal analogies the just rule furnished by the 
                                                                                                             
 35 Bodley, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 222. Bodley and Brown concerned title to land, 
which Swift explicitly excepted. They are, in their result, an application of local 
law. But large portions of the opinions are devoted to what Marshall called an 
“inquiry of vast importance whether . . . a court of equity acts upon its known, 
established and general principles, or is merely substituted for a court of law.” Id. 
 36 See infra Part III.B. 
 37 See, e.g., Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation, supra note 8, at 280, 
341–42 (equity is outcome-determinative vis-à-vis the common law, and “once 
the general principle was transposed into the federal system, equity was by its 
very nature outcome determinative vis-à-vis state law”). 
 38 See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945). 
 39 Id. at 108–09. 
 40 Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation, supra note 8, at 339. 
 41 Guar. Tr., 326 U.S. at 108. 
 42 Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation, supra note 8, at 338. 
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principles of equity to govern the case. Instead, they are, within con-
stitutional boundaries, “only another court of the State.”43 The ques-
tion for a federal equity court sitting in diversity is not, “What is 
equitable?”44 It is, instead, “What would a state court think is equi-
table?” The cabining of discretion, this Article argues, is antithetical 
to equity. Applying Henry Smith’s account of equity as a second-
order system, a kind of safety valve, this Article shows that Guar-
anty Trust removed the federal equity court’s capacity to stage a 
second-order intervention in diversity cases.45 
The final contribution of this Article draws on the facilitative 
conception of federal equity to both reinforce and normalize the eq-
uitable remedial rights doctrine that Guaranty Trust marginalized 
but, in order to maintain a modicum of decisional independence in 
the federal courts, nevertheless preserved. Federal courts have not 
discarded the doctrine and their application of it is, to put it mildly, 
uneven. This Article proposes a system of shifting presumptions for 
the application of the equitable remedial rights doctrine.46 The initial 
presumption follows the heterogeneity ordained by Guaranty Trust: 
state law governs when equitable relief is requested on a state-cre-
ated right.47 But that presumption can be rebutted in limited circum-
stances by showing that the requested equitable relief is preliminary 
or auxiliary to, or merely facilitates or aids the final determination 
of, the merits. These genuine preliminary injunctions do not engage 
Erie’s twin aims,48 and only arise when state law does not provide 
for them.49 And that presumption, in turn, can be rebutted by show-
                                                                                                             
 43 Guar. Tr., 326 U.S. at 108. 
 44 More accurately, “What is the correct application of equitable doctrine to 
the circumstances of this case?” 
 45 See Henry E. Smith, Fusing the Equitable Function in Private Law, in 
PRIVATE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 173, 175–76 (Kit Barker et al., eds., 2017). 
 46 See generally J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Pre-
sumptions, 67 N.Y.U.L. REV. 907, 907 (1992). 
 47 See Guar. Tr., 326 U.S. at 108–09. 
 48 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965). 
 49 See FED. R. CIV. P. 64(a) (making available “every remedy . . . that, under 
the law of the state where the court is located, provides for seizing a person or 
property to secure satisfaction of the potential judgment”); see also Grupo Mexi-
cano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 330–31 
(1999) (suggesting that Rule 64 governs injunctions restraining defendants from 
dealing with assets pending resolution of litigation). 
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ing that the requested equitable relief, although nominally facilita-
tive, is functionally equivalent to a conclusive determination of the 
litigation. 
Facilitative federal equity thus supplies a key, a structural guide, 
for answering our simple but difficult question. Preliminary injunc-
tions are typically equitable, but are issued to minimize the risk of 
irreparable injury to facilitate a final decision on the merits. In gen-
eral, then, federal law should govern unless the preliminary injunc-
tion effectively decides the merits of the case. It is hoped that the set 
of shifting presumptions provides real guidance to the federal courts 
in resolving the doctrinal confusion over preliminary injunctions. 
The argument proceeds as follows. Part II briefly reviews the 
nature of equity and its history leading up to the Founding. It sets 
out equity’s classical exclusive and facilitative jurisdictions, and re-
counts the challenges to, and responses of, equity in England and the 
American colonies. Part III analyzes the two prevailing conceptions 
of federal equity, arguing that the homogeneous conception began 
in 1809, about a decade earlier than previously thought, and that 
there is a deep conceptual tension between equity and Erie, which 
Guaranty Trust papered over. Part IV demonstrates that before 1809 
the federal courts administered a distinct facilitative conception of 
federal equity. It describes three instances in which the federal 
courts, concerned about their place in the new nation, took ad-
vantage of equity’s flexibility to cabin their power and accommo-
date state interests. This Part also argues that the facilitative concep-
tion of federal equity contributed in small part to the construction of 
the nascent American state. Part V incorporates the facilitative con-
ception of federal equity into a system of shifting presumptions to 
structure a federal court’s analysis under the equitable remedial 
rights doctrine. 
II. EQUITY: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS 
In the beginning, there was law and there was equity. Equity 
provided doctrines and remedies to supplement and mollify the rigor 
of the common law.50 By the mid-eighteenth century, equity had 
                                                                                                             
 50 HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 5. 
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long shed its reputation for unbounded, discretionary decision-mak-
ing.51 Equity’s association with the royal prerogative, however, was 
harder to cast off—especially because chancery sat without a jury.52 
Nevertheless, courts of chancery existed, at one time or another, in 
most of the American colonies.53 Some colonies, such as South Car-
olina, embraced equity wholeheartedly in the eighteenth century.54 
In others, like New York, the growth of equity jurisprudence was 
uneven, partly due to intense political hostility.55 But the founding 
generation was familiar with the law/equity divide, and Article III 
extended the judicial power to all cases “in law and equity.”56 
This Part briefly highlights that one of equity’s classic and im-
portant functions is to aid and assist the vindication of rights at com-
mon law. This is known as equity’s auxiliary or facilitative jurisdic-
tion.57 It is this jurisdiction, transposed to the new federalism, that 
the federal courts deployed in the early years of the Republic to con-
tribute to the construction of the nascent United States. 
                                                                                                             
 51 Equity became “a highly articulated system . . . consist[ing] of a series of 
distinct remedial devices” and “a set of conditions that determine whether equita-
ble relief is appropriate.” Thomas W. Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 
128 HARV. L. REV. 1630, 1669–70 (2015). One of equity’s central features is the 
development of “a set of principles or guidelines to structure the exercise of” great 
“discretion so as to make it socially useful.” Id. at 1669. 
 52 Stanley N. Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controversies 
over Chancery Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century, in LAW IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 257, 260 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971); 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 54–55 (2d ed. 1985). 
 53 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 54. 
 54 See James Nelson Frierson, Legal Introduction, in 6 RECORDS OF THE 
COURT OF CHANCERY OF SOUTH CAROLINA 1671-1779, at 20, 53–54 (Anne King 
Gregorie ed., 1950); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 54. 
 55 Joseph H. Smith & Leo Hershkowitz, Courts of Equity in the Province of 
New York: The Cosby Controversy, 1732–1736, 16 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 6–8, 40 
(1972); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 54–55. 
 56 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 57 HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 11–12; see also Baker v. Biddle, 2 F. 
Cas. 439, 446 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 764). 
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A. The Nature of Equity 
The standard definition of “equity” is not analytically satisfying 
but proudly question-begging:58 “the principles of the system of ju-
dicial remedies which had been devised and was being administered 
by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of the 
two countries.”59 Entirely separate from the common law courts, the 
Court of Chancery exercised equity jurisdiction in England until 
1873, when the Chancery Division was created within the High 
Court of Justice.60 Chancery recognized forms of equitable property 
(trusts, mortgages, and priorities of estates and interests), enforced 
torts by injunction, enforced contracts by specific performance and 
injunction, afforded relief against the rigidity of the common law 
(fraud, undue influence, accident, and mistake), and provided pro-
cedural convenience (account, interrogatories, and discovery).61 
Modern perspectives of equity center on Maitland’s famous dic-
tum that equity is a “gloss” on the common law.62 The common law 
                                                                                                             
 58 F. W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: 
TWO COURSES OF LECTURES 1 (A.H. Chaytor & W. J. Whittaker eds., 1984) 
(“What is Equity? . . . Equity is a certain portion of our existing substantive law, 
and yet in order that we may describe this portion and mark it off from other 
portions we have to make reference to courts that are no longer in existence.”). 
See generally WILLIAM W. BILLSON, EQUITY IN ITS RELATIONS TO COMMON 
LAW: A STUDY IN LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 3–5 (1917). 
 59 Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 
308, 318 (1999) (quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 
(1939)). 
 60 See generally D. M. KERLY, AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE EQUITABLE 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 1 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1986) 
(1890); Supreme Court Judicature Act 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 (Eng.). 
 61 See 1 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 252, 404–06 
(1903); HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 10. See generally KERLY, supra note 
60, at 191–92. 
 62 MAITLAND, supra note 58, at 18–19 (“We ought not to think of common 
law and equity as of two rival systems. Equity was not a self-sufficient system, at 
every point it presupposed the existence of the common law. Common law was a 
self-sufficient system. I mean this: that if the legislature had passed a short act 
saying ‘Equity is hereby abolished,’ we might still have got on fairly well; in some 
respects our law would have been barbarous, unjust, absurd, but still the great 
elementary rights, the right to immunity from violence, the right to one’s good 
name, the rights of ownership and of possession would have been decently pro-
tected and contract would have been enforced. On the other hand had the legisla-
ture said, ‘Common law is hereby abolished,’ this decree if obeyed would have 
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and equity are not “two rival systems”; equity is “a sort of appendix 
added on to our code.”63 Equity supplements rather than substitutes 
the common law.64 Equity assumes the operation of the common 
law, and alters or aids that operation.65 In a modern functional char-
acterization, equity is an ex post second-order intervention.66 The 
common law supplies the first order rules, and equity acts on a party 
who has opportunistically taken advantage of the harshness or ab-
surdity of the common law.67 
B. Equity’s Exclusive and Facilitative Jurisdiction 
Equity jurisdiction can be divided into exclusive jurisdiction on 
the one hand, and facilitative or auxiliary jurisdiction on the other.68 
The exclusive jurisdiction comprises areas where only equity can 
provide relief.69 Enforcing a trust is the classic example. Tradition-
ally, the common law did not recognize trusts, so relief for breach 
of trust was available only in equity.70 Similarly, a vendor suing to 
set aside a conveyance of land for undue influence had to proceed 
in equity.71 In general, the exclusive jurisdiction included cases 
where a plaintiff had sued on an equitable right, which the common 
law refused to recognize.72 
Equity’s facilitative or auxiliary jurisdiction was exercised in aid 
of legal rights.73 The early American federal judiciary assured the 
                                                                                                             
meant anarchy. At every point equity presupposed the existence of common 
law.”). 
 63 MAITLAND, supra note 58, at 18–19. Accord 1 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND 
AMERICA 13 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1836) (“[Lord Bacon] said, Chancery 
is ordained to supply the law, and not to subvert the law. Finch . . . says, that the 
nature of Equity is to amplify, enlarge, and add to the letter of the law.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 64 MAITLAND, supra note 58, at 18–19. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Smith, supra note 45, at 175–79, 181–83. 
 67 See generally id. 
 68 HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 11–12; see also David Yale, A Trichot-
omy of Equity, 6 J. LEGAL HISTORY 194, 194–96 (1985). 
 69 HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 11. 
 70 See generally id. at 7, 10–11. 
 71 See generally id. 
 72 See generally id. 
 73 See id. at 11–12. 
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states, using two equitable devices, that the central government was 
sensitive to their interests.74 The first is discovery. Before the mid-
nineteenth century, discovery was available at common law only 
with the assistance of equity.75 A defendant in a common law action 
seeking documents from the plaintiff would have to file a bill of dis-
covery in the court of chancery and, if successful, an injunction 
would stay the legal proceedings until the information was dis-
closed.76 Any documents discovered, if proved and admissible, 
could be evidence in the action at law.77 Second, an important com-
ponent of the facilitative jurisdiction is the injunction to restrain the 
violation of a common law right.78 This includes threatened viola-
tions, as well as continued or repeated violations of legal rights.79 
Before 1852, chancery did not decide common law questions.80 So, 
if a plaintiff apprehended an imminent violation of a common law 
right, then equity could provide interim injunctive relief to facilitate 
the common law determination of whether a right had been vio-
lated.81 The interim injunction was made perpetual if the common 
law right was violated, and dissolved if not.82 
                                                                                                             
 74 See infra Part IV. 
 75 See Mark Leeming, Commentary, Seeking Documentary Evidence in 
Transnational Litigation: Problems and Pitfalls, in INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL LAW, LITIGATION, AND ARBITRATION 90, 90 (K. E. Lindgren & N. 
Perram eds., 2011) (discussing the bill of discovery procedure in the Court of 
Chancery before 1852); McLean v. Burns Philp Tr. Co. [1985] 2 NSWLR 623, 
644 (Austl.) (discussing the bill of discovery procedure in the Court of Chancery 
before 1852). 
 76 See Leeming, supra note 75, at 90. 
 77 For a Founding-era innovation, see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 15, 1 
Stat. 73, 82 (1789). 
 78 HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 708. 
 79 Id. 
 80 KERLY, supra note 60, at 285. A statute enacted in 1852 permitted the 
Court of Chancery to determine common law rights and titles without requiring 
litigants to file a separate action at law. 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 62. In 1862, legis-
lation hardened this power into a duty. Chancery Regulation Act of 1862, 25 & 
26 Vict. c. 42, s. 1. 
 81 See, e.g., Harman v. Jones (1841) 41 Eng. Rep. 505, 505 (Ch). 
 82 See, e.g., id.; Bacon v. Jones (1839) 41 Eng. Rep. 167, 169 (Ch). 
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C. Hostility to Equity: The Chancellor’s Foot and the King’s 
Conscience 
Two broad and persistent criticisms were leveled at chancery. 
The first was directed at equity’s arbitrariness and subjectivity. In 
England, Selden most effectively attacked equity, or conscience, as 
nothing more than the idiosyncratic and personal moral judgment of 
the chancellor.83 In a criticism published posthumously in 1689, he 
famously lambasted equity as a “roguish thing,” because it was 
measured against the chancellor’s conscience.84 We may as well, 
said Selden, “make [th]e Standard for [th]e measure we[] call A 
foot, . . . [th]e Chancellor[’]s foot . . . One Chancellor ha[]s a long 
foot[,] another A short foot[,] a third an indifferent foot; ’tis [th]e 
same thing in [th]e Chancellor’s Conscience.”85 
The second criticism was that chancery, having originated in the 
curia regis, was “closely associated with the royal prerogative.”86 
Commencing in the late 1500s, English common lawyers, with some 
popular support, launched a sustained assault on chancery.87 Sir Ed-
ward Coke frequently resisted attempts by James I to interfere with 
the common law courts.88 Things came to a head in 1615, when 
James overruled Coke and upheld Lord Chancellor Ellesmere’s 
view “[t]hat when a Judgment [at common law] is obtained by Op-
pression, Wrong and a hard Conscience, the Chancellor will frus-
trate and set it aside, not for any error or Defect in the Judgment, but 
for the hard Conscience of the Party.”89 
Both criticisms made their way to the New World; chancery’s 
association with the monarch proved almost devastating in some 
colonies.90 By the eighteenth century, “[h]ostility to chancery was 
                                                                                                             
 83 TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43 (Frederick Pollock ed. 1927). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. Accord Mike Macnair, Equity and Conscience, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 659, 680 (2007); M. Macnair, Arbitrary Chancellors and the Problem of 
Predictability, in LAW & EQUITY: APPROACHES IN ROMAN LAW AND COMMON 
LAW 79, 83 (E. Koops & W.J. Zwalve eds., 2014); DENNIS R. KLINCK, 
CONSCIENCE, EQUITY AND THE COURT OF CHANCERY IN EARLY MODERN 
ENGLAND 2 (2010). 
 86 Katz, supra note 52, at 260. Accord FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 54–55. 
 87 Katz, supra note 52, at 260. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615) 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 487–89 (Ch). 
 90 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 54–55; Katz, supra note 52, at 260, 265. 
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widespread.”91 Massachusetts, for example, never established a sep-
arate court of chancery (although it selectively conferred some eq-
uity jurisdiction on common law courts).92 In New York, colonists 
attacked the court of chancery as a juryless emanation of the Crown, 
and the legislative assembly repeatedly protested various governors’ 
assertions of a unilateral power to create a separate equity court.93 
This decades-long maelstrom curbed the development of equity.94 
Pennsylvania, after several failed efforts, established its first and 
only separate court of chancery in 1720, which operated with a sig-
nificant docket.95 But after opposition intensified, it was disbanded 
in 1736.96 In both New York and Pennsylvania, hostility to chancery 
focused on equity’s potential for abuse rather than its ideology.97 
                                                                                                             
 91 FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 54. Accord 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS 
TO 1801, at 493 (1971) (“[T]he very word ‘chancery’ was identified with prerog-
ative in the popular mind, and so unamendably un-American.”). 
 92 See Phyllis Maloney Johnson, No Adequate Remedy at Law: Equity in 
Massachusetts 1692–1877 (Aug. 25, 2008), in YALE L. SCH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
REPOSITORY 3 (2012), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1001&context=student_legal_history_papers; FRIEDMAN, supra note 64, 
at 54. 
 93 Smith & Hershkowitz, supra note 55, at 6–8, 40; see also FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 55, at 54–55. 
 94 Smith & Hershkowitz, supra note 55, at 2; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 
55, at 54–55. 
 95 Sydney G. Fisher, The Administration of Equity Through Common Law 
Forms, 1 L.Q. REV. 455, 456–57 (1885). 
 96 Id. 
 97 David Thomas Konig, Regionalism in Early American Law, in 1 THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: EARLY AMERICA (1580–1815) 144, 
175 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlin eds., 2008); Katz, supra note 52, 
at 265 (“In the colonial period, at least, Americans objected to chancery courts 
rather than to equity law.”); id. at 282 (“Equity law was accepted by all con-
cerned—the dispute was over the constitution of the courts that dispensed eq-
uity.”); see also Calvin Woodard, Joseph Story and American Equity, 45 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 623, 641 (1988) (“For purely political reasons . . . equity started 
off in this country with a black eye.”). But cf. GOEBEL, supra note 104, at 493 
(“Equity was a word Americans had learned to live with as an ingredient of jus-
tice, but in states where there were no distinct chancery courts this forbearance 
did not extend to more than a niggardly borrowing of the procedures by which 
equity jurisprudence had been administered in England.”); id. at 500 (when dis-
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D. Equity’s Response: Systematize and Support 
English chancery developed two responses to the criticisms of 
arbitrariness and prerogative tyranny. First, beginning in the early 
sixteenth century, equity evolved from a personal morality and sub-
jective conscience into a systematic body of principle.98 In 1676, 
Nottingham, the father of systematic equity, proclaimed that “[w]ith 
such a conscience as is only naturalis et interna [natural and inter-
nal, inward, personal], this Court has nothing to do; the conscience 
by which I am to proceed is merely civilis et politica [civic and po-
litical, external, public], and tied to certain measures.”99 The transi-
tion was complete by the early nineteenth century under Eldon as 
Lord Chancellor.100 
Second, despite Ellesmere’s victory over Coke, chancery did not 
then run roughshod over the common law.101 Bacon, Ellesmere’s 
successor, published orders in 1618 to prevent abuse of injunctions 
staying actions at law.102 In 1759, Hardwicke wrote that since the 
Glorious Revolution, chancery judges “endeavoured with much 
anxiety to preserve the boundaries of common law and equity from 
being confounded; and have sent forth their injunctions to stop the 
course of the common law with a cautious and sparing hand.”103 Im-
portantly, in 1734, the Master of the Rolls, Sir Joseph Jekyll, noted 
that the common law and equity had ceased their adversarial rela-
tionship.104 The “rules of law and equity,” said Jekyll, “are not to 
oppose, but each, in its turn, to be subservient to the other.”105 Equity 
in some cases “follows the law implicitly, in others, assists it, and 
                                                                                                             
cussing the Congressional debates over the first Judiciary Act, “the inveterate be-
lief in the virtues of jury trial had much to do with the apparent disinclination to 
implement the jurisdiction in equity”). 
 98 JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 346–61 (2009); 
HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 8–11. 
 99 Cook v. Fountain (1676) 36 Eng. Rep. 984, 990; Dennis R. Klinck, Lord 
Nottingham and the Conscience of Equity, 67 J. HIST. IDEAS 123, 125 (2006). 
 100 LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 98, at 352–53; HEYDON ET AL., supra note 
16, at 8–11. 
 101 See KERLY, supra note 60, at 99–100. 
 102 Id. at 116. 
 103 Id. at 166. 
 104 Cowper v. Cowper (1734) 24 Eng. Rep. 930, 942 (Ch). 
 105 Id. 
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advances the remedy; in others again, it relieves against the abuse, 
or allays the rigour of it; but in no case does it contradict or over-
turn the grounds or principles thereof.”106 
In the American colonies, Joseph Story argued in his influential 
treatise that equity “can scarcely be said to have been generally stud-
ied, or administered, as a system of enlightened and exact principles, 
until about the close of the eighteenth century.”107 Story invoked 
Hamilton’s observation about the “material diversity” of chancery 
jurisdiction that existed in the several states in the late eighteenth 
century.108 Story also invoked the lack of a mature system of law 
reports.109 Plainly, there is much truth to Story’s claim—particularly 
about the diversity of colonial institutional arrangements—and it 
resonates today.110 But a more complete picture of colonial chancery 
has emerged since Story wrote his treatise, and it cautions against 
the absolute conclusion that colonial equity was a dead letter. 
Despite the colonists’ hostility to the institution of the court of 
chancery, equity nevertheless made halting progress to systematize 
its jurisdiction and support the common law. Maryland, for example, 
recognized equity as a separate system from the 1650s, when equity 
suits were heard in the court of chancery.111 As early as the late sev-
                                                                                                             
 106 Id. 
 107 STORY, supra note 63, at 63. 
 108 Id. at 62–63; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 502–03 (Alexander Ham-
ilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 109 STORY, supra note 63, at 63. 
 110 Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler, in their important first edition, noted 
that “in 1789 equity was either non-existent or undeveloped in the courts of many 
of the states.” HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 578 (1st ed. 1953). See, e.g., John F. Preis, In 
Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in Constitutional Cases, 22 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS J. 1, 23–24 (2013) (“[E]quity in the states was in disarray at the Found-
ing.”); id. at 24 (claiming that there was no “coherent body of equity law at the 
state level”); Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. 
L. REV. 997, 1011 (2015) (“[I]n 1789 the equity of the nascent United States was 
relatively feeble and unsystematic.”); cf. PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW’S 
CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 103 (1990) (“An 
American law of equity was beginning to emerge in some of the states, but other 
states had no equity courts.”). 
 111 Bernard C. Steiner, Maryland’s First Courts, in 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1901, at 211, 227 (1902); 
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enteenth century, procedure and remedies were consciously mod-
eled on English chancery, and practitioners in England were con-
sulted on points of dispute.112 Injunctions were granted, specific per-
formance decreed, and jurisdiction assumed over trusts and matters 
of fraud and mistake.113A surprising number of eighteenth-century 
Maryland lawyers were educated at the Inns of Court.114 Similarly, 
in eighteenth-century South Carolina, the doctrines and remedies of 
equity were well understood and competently administered.115 In 
Virginia, by the second quarter of the eighteenth century, the equity 
cases brought to the General Court “were pleaded with tolerable 
learning and skill.”116 At around the same time, “an extensive juris-
diction in chancery was . . . emerging” in Virginia’s county 
courts.117 Indeed Richard Francis, who wrote the influential English 
                                                                                                             
see also J. Hall Pleasants, The First Century of the Court of Chancery of Mary-
land, in 51 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND: PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT OF 
CHANCERY OF MARYLAND 1669–1679, at xxxii, xxxiv (J. Hall Pleasants ed., 
1934). 
 112 Carroll T. Bond, Introduction to the Legal Procedure, in 51 ARCHIVES OF 
MARYLAND: PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF MARYLAND 1669–
1679, supra note 111 at xxii; see also Richard B. Morris, Book Review, 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 632, 633 (1935) (reviewing 51 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF MARYLAND, 1669–1679 (J. Hall 
Pleasants ed., 1934)). 
 113 Morris, supra note 112, at 633; see also Pleasants, supra note 111, at xxxii–
iii. 
 114 See Letter of Transmittal from Samuel K. Dennis et al., to the Maryland 
Historical Society (Sept. 1, 1934), in 51 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND: PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF MARYLAND 1669–1679, supra note 111, at ix, 
xii; Robert von Moschzisker, Book Review, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 1040, 1041 (1929) 
(reviewing CARROLL T. BOND, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND, A 
HISTORY (1928)). 
 115 See Frierson, supra note 54, at 53–54; see also Stanley M. Levy, Book 
Review, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 165, 167 (1950) (reviewing 6 RECORDS OF THE COURT 
OF CHANCERY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1671–1779 (Anne King Gregorie ed., 
1950)); R.L. Meriwether, Book Review, 17 J.S. HIST. 71, 71 (1951) (reviewing 6 
AMERICAN LEGAL RECORDS: RECORDS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA, 1671–1779 (Anne King Gregorie ed., 1950)). 
 116 Marvin K. Singleton, New Light on the Chancery Side of Virginia’s Evo-
lution to Statehood, 2 J. AM. STUD. 149, 156 (1969). 
 117 William E. Nelson, Law and the Structure of Power in Colonial Virginia, 
48 VAL. U.L. REV. 757, 817–18 (2014). 
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text Maxims of Equity in 1729, immigrated to Virginia in 1738, and 
practiced before the General Court in chancery.118 
A subservient equity jurisdiction emerged and even grew in col-
onies openly hostile to chancery. In the first half of the eighteenth 
century, the Pennsylvania common law courts were vested with eq-
uity jurisdiction, no doubt to remedy the absence of a separate court 
of chancery.119 In 1768, for example, a plaintiff brought an action of 
debt on a bond—a common law action.120 At common law, of 
course, a defendant could not raise an equitable defense such as mis-
take or failure of consideration.121 To raise an equitable defense, the 
defendant would file a bill in the court of chancery and, if successful, 
chancery would enjoin the action at law.122 But in 1768, there was 
no court of chancery in Pennsylvania.123 Rather than have the de-
fendant go remediless, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania permit-
ted equitable defenses in common law actions.124 The Court held 
that “there being no Court of Chancery in this Province, there is a 
                                                                                                             
 118 See Jones v. Porter (Gen. Ct. Va. 1740), in THOMAS JEFFERSON, REPORTS 
OF CASES DETERMINED IN THE GENERAL COURT OF VIRGINIA FROM 1730, TO 
1740, AND FROM 1768, TO 1772, at 62, 66 n.* (Charlottesville, F. Carr., & Co. 
1829). Baker called Maxims of Equity “the first published book on equity.” J. H. 
BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 111 n.79 (4th ed. 2002). 
See also LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 98, at 339 n.82; W.H. Bryson, Francis, 
Richard, OXFORD DICTIONARY NAT’L BIOGRAPHY, http://www.oxforddnb.com/
view/article/47165. 
 119 This was the second time that this was done. See generally William Henry 
Rawle, Equity in Pennsylvania, Lecture Before the Law Academy of Philadelphia 
(Feb. 11, 1868), in EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA 1–12 (Philadelphia, Kay & Bros. 
1868). In 1684, Pennsylvania’s Assembly passed a law providing that “every 
court of justice should be a court of equity as well as of law.” Id. at 9. County 
courts exercised jurisdiction at common law and in equity. Appeal from the 
county courts was to the provincial court, which also tried any cases at law and in 
equity over which the county courts could not exercise jurisdiction. See id. at 5–
8. The law establishing the county courts was disallowed in London in 1693. The 
colonial assembly immediately re-established the courts, but they transacted very 
little business. See generally Fisher, supra note 95, at 455–56; Spencer R. Liver-
ant & Walter H. Hitchler, A History of Equity in Pennsylvania, 37 DICK. L. REV. 
156, 159–60 (1933); WILLIAM H. LLOYD, THE EARLY COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA 
168–69 (1910). 
 120 Swift v. Hawkins, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 17, 17, 1 Ald. 7 (Pa. 1768). 
 121 HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 34. 
 122 Id. 
 123 FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 54. 
 124 Swift v. Hawkins, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 17. 
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necessity, in order to prevent a failure of Justice, to let the Defend-
ants . . . prove mistake or want of consideration.”125 By the second 
half of the eighteenth century, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
routinely used the absence of a separate court of chancery to justify 
the application of equitable doctrines.126 The Pennsylvania courts, 
however, did not assume complete equity powers.127 A similar trend 
occurred in Massachusetts, which emerged as a leader in trust law 
despite the absence of a court of chancery.128 
E. At the Founding 
With little argument at the Convention, Article III of the Consti-
tution extended the federal judicial power to “law and equity.”129 
Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred equity jurisdiction 
on the federal courts,130 but section 16 prohibited suits in equity “in 
any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at 
                                                                                                             
 125 Id. Chief Justice William Allen added that this practice—the interposition 
of mistake and failure of consideration (equitable defenses) in an action of debt 
sur obligation (a legal action)—was “known to be the constant practice of the 
Courts of Justice in this Province for thirty nine Years past.” Id. This would put 
the availability of equitable defenses in legal actions at 1729, when the separate 
court of chancery was still operational. 
 126 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Fury, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 72, 72, 1 Ald. 20 (Pa. 1783) (a 
beneficial owner of land could bring an action for ejectment, Justice Atlee observ-
ing that “[w]e have no Court of Equity here; and, therefore, unless the cestui que 
trust could bring an ejectment in his own name, he would be without remedy, in 
the case of an obstinate trustee”); James v. Browne, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 339, 339, 1 
Ald. 98 (Pa. 1788) (noting that “we have no Court of Chancery to interpose an 
equitable jurisdiction,” and “[t]he necessity of a liberal extension of the action of 
Account render between joint partners, is apparent”); Wharton v. Morris, 1 U.S. 
(1 Dall.) 125, 125–26, 1 Ald. 35 (Pa. 1785) (common law courts would administer 
equity to remedy a penal bond or a breach of trust). 
 127 In Dorrow v. Kelly, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 142, 144, 1 Ald. 42 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Phila. 
Cty. 1785), Edward Shippen, then President of the Philadelphia Court of Common 
Pleas, observed that “[t]he Courts of law in this state, have in some instances 
adopted the chancery rules, to prevent the absolute failure of justice.” Id. But 
“[b]eing a Court of law, we cannot take upon ourselves to act as a Court of chan-
cery.” Id. Accordingly, the common pleas could not foreclose the equity of re-
demption, or impose terms upon a mortgagor applying to redeem. See id. at 144–
145. 
 128 See Johnson, supra note 92, at 3. 
 129 See GOEBEL, supra note 91, at 240; DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, COURTS FOR 
A NEW NATION 9 (1971); HOFFER, supra note 110, at 95. 
 130 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78–79 (1789). 
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law.”131 Consonant with the colonial experience, much of the hos-
tility to equity in the early United States centered on its mode of 
implementation—lack of a jury—rather than its doctrine. For exam-
ple, in the Senate debate on what became section 16, “more was said 
in favor of Chancery than against.”132 It was the “inveterate belief 
in the virtues of jury trial” that accounted for the “apparent disincli-
nation to implement the jurisdiction in equity.”133 That said, both the 
Federal Farmer and Brutus attacked equity itself. The Federal 
Farmer thought that it was “a very dangerous thing to vest in the 
same judge power to decide on the law, and also general powers in 
equity,” because “if the law restrain him, he is only to step into his 
shoes of equity, and give what judgment his reason or opinion may 
dictate.”134 Brutus argued that the federal courts, being invested with 
both equity jurisdiction and jurisdiction arising under the Constitu-
tion, “will not confine themselves to any fixed or established rules, 
but will determine, according to what appears to them, the reason 
and spirit of the constitution.”135 
From 1792 to 1938, equity jurisdiction was exercised by the eq-
uity “side” of the federal courts.136 Procedure was pegged first to 
“the course of the civil law” (from 1789 to 1792),137and then to “the 
principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of equity . . . as 
contradistinguished from courts of common law” (from 1792 to 
1912).138 In 1792, the Supreme Court also acquired procedural rule-
making power for the equity side of the federal courts, which it ex-
ercised in an ad hoc manner in 1822 and 1842, and comprehensively 
                                                                                                             
 131 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82. (“[S]uits in equity shall 
not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where 
plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law”). 
 132 GOEBEL, supra note 91, at 499–500. 
 133 Id. at 500. 
 134 Letter from the Federal Farmer, No. III (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST: OBJECTIONS OF NON-SIGNERS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION AND MAJOR SERIES OF ESSAYS AT THE OUTSET 234, 244 (Herbert 
J. Storing ed., 1981). 
 135 Essays of Brutus No. XI (Jan. 31, 1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST: OBJECTIONS OF NON-SIGNERS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND MAJOR 
SERIES OF ESSAYS AT THE OUTSET, supra note 134, at 417, 420. 
 136 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 560–61 (7th ed. 2015). 
 137 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94 (1789). 
 138 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792). 
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in 1912.139 In 1915, Congress permitted cases to be transferred be-
tween the equity and law sides of the federal courts, and equitable 
defenses to be raised on the common law side “without the necessity 
of filing a bill on the equity side of the court.”140 The equity side of 
the federal courts operated under the 1915 statute and, with minor 
modifications, the Equity Rules of 1912, until the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure were enacted in 1938.141 
III. THE TWO CONCEPTIONS OF FEDERAL EQUITY 
Federal courts administer two distinct conceptions of equity. 
The first, which the federal courts have been applying since the 
dawn of the Republic, is uniform or homogeneous. When laboring 
under this conception, a federal court possesses “authority to admin-
ister in equity suits the principles of the system of judicial remedies 
which had been devised and was being administered by the English 
Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of the two coun-
tries.”142 Federal courts sit as national courts administering homo-
geneous equity throughout the country. Today the homogeneous 
conception is reserved for cases where federal courts enforce federal 
rights, or when they invoke the equitable remedial rights doctrine. 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, the homo-
geneous conception exhausted federal equity and applied even when 
federal courts enforced state-created rights.143 The second concep-
tion of federal equity is heterogeneous. If a party requests the federal 
court apply equitable doctrine or relief when enforcing a state-cre-
ated right, then the federal court will apply state law, including state 
equity.144 That is the basic holding of Guaranty Trust, which held 
that federal equity courts sitting in diversity could not ignore an ap-
plicable state statute of limitations when enforcing a state right.145 
                                                                                                             
 139 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 136, at 560–61. 
 140 Act of Mar. 3, 1915, ch. 90, §§ 274a–274b, 38 Stat. 956, 956 (1915). 
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 142 Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 
308, 318 (1999) (quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I.S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 
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The heterogeneity arises because the content of the equity adminis-
tered by the federal court differs from state to state. 
This Part reviews the content and development of the homoge-
neous and heterogeneous conceptions of federal equity. It shows, 
first, that the Supreme Court under Marshall asserted an equitable 
homogeneity about ten years before conventionally recognized. This 
synchronizes homogeneous federal equity with the expansion of 
federal jurisdiction (and increased power of the Supreme Court) in 
other areas. Second, after explaining that Frankfurter’s opinion in 
Guaranty Trust reimagined Erie as a comprehensive legal philoso-
phy, this Part reveals a deep conceptual tension between the hetero-
geneous federal equity established by Guaranty Trust and “the prin-
ciples of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised 
and was being administered by the English High Court of Chancery 
at the time of the founding.”146 Using Henry Smith’s account of eq-
uity as a second-order system, a kind of safety valve, this analysis 
suggests that Guaranty Trust obliterated not only homogeneous fed-
eral equity, but also a federal court’s capacity to act as a court of 
equity when enforcing state-created rights. 
A. Homogeneous Federal Equity 
Since their creation, federal courts have applied homogeneous 
equity. After Guaranty Trust was decided in 1945, homogeneous 
equity only applies when federal courts enforce federal rights or ap-
ply what remains of the equitable remedial rights doctrine. But be-
fore 1945, federal equity was homogeneous equity, that is, it was 
coextensive with the full scope of the equity jurisdiction of the Eng-
lish High Court of Chancery at the Founding.147 In nineteenth-cen-
tury diversity cases, under the Swift v. Tyson regime, homogeneous 
equity governed the equitable aspects of the bill.148 Suppose, for ex-
ample, that plaintiff sued on a legal right for an equitable remedy. 
Then ordinary legal rules governed whether the legal right was vio-
lated—say, whether a contract was breached.149 If the federal equity 
                                                                                                             
 146 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 335 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co., 306 U.S. at 568). 
 147 See Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 335 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Atlas Life Ins. Co., 306 U.S. at 568. 
 148 See Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation, supra note 8, at 284. 
 149 See id. at 283–84. 
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court concluded that the contract had been breached, then it would 
apply homogeneous equity doctrine to determine whether the plain-
tiff was entitled to equitable relief.150 Or suppose, taking a different 
example, that plaintiff sued on an equitable right—say, plaintiff 
sued her trustee or fiduciary.151 Then homogeneous equity governed 
the entire lawsuit, because trusts and fiduciaries were not recognized 
at law.152 And suppose, as a final example, that plaintiff brought a 
simple breach of contract action on the common law side of the fed-
eral court, and defendant wanted to raise an equitable defense. The 
common law did not recognize equitable defenses, so defendant 
would file a bill on the equity side to restrain the proceedings at 
law.153 The equity side of the federal court would apply homogene-
ous equity to determine whether defendant could make out the eq-
uitable defense.154 
1. ORIGINS: BODLEY AND BROWN (1809) 
In 1818 and 1819, the Supreme Court decided two cases that 
courts and commentators have credited with definitively establish-
ing that “federal judges applied nonstate uniform equity principles 
to determine the applicable procedures, remedies, and—in certain 
cases—substantive principles.”155 In Robinson v. Campbell, an ac-
tion at law for ejectment, the Court excluded evidence proving an 
equitable title in the defendant, notwithstanding that such evidence 
would have been admitted in the state common law court to make 
out an equitable defense.156 Justice Todd held that federal court rem-
edies “are to be, at common law or in equity, not according to the 
practice of state courts, but according to the principles of common 
law and equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from 
which we derive our knowledge of those principles.”157 And in 
United States v. Howland & Allen, a judgment creditor’s suit filed 
                                                                                                             
 150 See, e.g., Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101 (1915). 
 151 See generally HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 5. 
 152 Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation, supra note 8, at 269. 
 153 J. P. McBaine, Equitable Defenses to Actions at Law in the Federal Courts, 
17 CAL. L. REV. 591, 592 (1929). 
 154 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Bowman, 15 F. Cas. 21 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1858) (No. 
8,134). 
 155 Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation, supra note 8, at 265, 272–75. 
 156 See Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 213, 218–22 (1818). 
 157 Id. at 222–23. 
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in equity, the Court held that a state statute providing a remedy at 
law did not deprive the federal court of equity jurisdiction.158 Chief 
Justice Marshall confirmed that “the Courts of the Union have a 
Chancery jurisdiction in every state, and the judiciary act confers the 
same Chancery powers on all, and gives the same rule of deci-
sion.”159 
Entirely missing from this narrative are two cases decided about 
a decade before Robinson and Howland & Allen, where the Supreme 
Court paved the way for a robust assertion of homogeneous federal 
equity. Scholars have overlooked Bodley v. Taylor and Taylor v. 
Brown, two cases filed on the equity side of the federal court in Ken-
tucky, where the Court, guided by Marshall, invoked and asserted 
homogeneous federal equity after real deliberation.160 The Court had 
Bodley under consideration for three years: argument commenced 
in February 1806 and a final opinion issued in March 1809.161 In 
February 1807, Marshall delivered a one-paragraph opinion “as to a 
part only of this case,” holding that a federal court exercising equity 
jurisdiction “will proceed according to the principles of equity.”162 
In the complete 1809 opinion, Marshall doubled down on homoge-
neous federal equity. He proclaimed that “the jurisdiction exercised 
by a court of chancery is not granted by statute; it is assumed by 
itself,” and that “it will exercise that jurisdiction upon its own prin-
ciples.”163 It seems, then, that in its initial Bodley decision—eleven 
years before Robinson, twelve years before Howland & Allen—the 
Court decided, after consideration, that federal courts exercise eq-
uity jurisdiction according to their own general principles.164 
                                                                                                             
 158 See United States v. Howland & Allen, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 108, 115–16 
(1819). 
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 160 See Bodley v. Taylor, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 191, 222 (1809); Taylor v. Brown, 
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 164 The argument in Brown also provides insight into the early Marshall 
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Court would tolerate a deviation from regular chancery procedure if it was an 
established state practice that did not produce acute difficulties. At that time, the 
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Bodley and Brown were about the application of general equita-
ble principles to Kentucky’s convoluted land law. Kentucky statute 
prescribed four steps for the acquisition of land: obtain a warrant 
from the governor, file an entry with the county surveyor (which 
was placed on public record), survey the land, and return the survey 
to the land office.165 The land office then issued a patent, which was 
conclusive evidence of legal title.166 But completing prior steps, be-
fore a patent issued, conferred equitable interests which a court of 
chancery would recognize.167 Importantly, the equitable interests 
thus created were specific applications of general equitable princi-
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 165 See Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, Land Claims, Early, in THE KENTUCKY 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 535 (John E. Kleber ed., 2015) [hereinafter Tachau, Land 
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entry directing and controlling the survey.” Wilson v. Mason, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
45, 65 (1801). 
 166 See Tachau, Land Claims, supra note 165, at 535. 
 167 See Bodley v. Taylor, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 191, 220–21, 222–23 (1809); 
Brown, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 241. 
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ples for resolving conflicting interests and priorities; they were nec-
essary because “governors issued warrants with such extrava-
gance.”168 So, for example, filing a valid entry with the county sur-
veyor conferred an equitable interest in the land described.169 In gen-
eral, if an entry was filed after a patent had issued, then the earlier 
legal title prevailed.170 If, however, an entry was filed before a patent 
issued, then the patentee took the legal title subject to the earlier eq-
uitable interest, because the patentee had constructive notice of the 
prior entry (the prior entry was on the public record).171 In such a 
case, the patentee held the legal title on trust for the equitable owner: 
the equitable owner could repair to a court of equity to compel the 
patentee to convey the legal title.172 
In Bodley, defendant filed an entry in 1780 and acquired legal 
title as patentee in 1786.173 The defendant’s patent, however, in-
cluded land that was not described in his entry.174 Defendant, there-
fore, had legal title to surplus land over which he had never acquired 
equitable title.175 Plaintiffs claimed that the defendant’s surplus land 
was within an entry that they had filed for a parcel of land in 1783, 
before defendant had acquired legal title.176 The equity side of the 
district court in Kentucky decreed that defendant convey to plain-
tiffs the legal title to the surplus land.177 In Brown, plaintiffs’ and 
defendants’ surveys overlapped, and legal title had been acquired by 
both.178 Plaintiffs had surveyed first but patented last, and argued 
that defendants had taken legal title over the overlapping land sub-
ject to their prior equitable interest.179 The equity side of the federal 
district court in Kentucky dismissed plaintiffs’ claim.180 
                                                                                                             
 168 Tachau, Land Claims, supra note 165, at 535. 
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In both cases, Marshall framed his opinion in equitable terms: to 
resolve the competing equitable priorities. His initial Bodley opinion 
in 1807 invoked homogeneous federal equity, holding that a subse-
quent patentee (the owner at law) is on constructive notice of any 
prior entry, and that “the legal title will be considered as holden [i.e., 
held on trust] for him who has the prior equity.”181 In the final 1809 
Bodley opinion, Marshall therefore ordered defendant to convey to 
plaintiffs “the lands lying within his patent and theirs, which were 
not within his entry.”182 And in Brown, Marshall said that “[t]he sur-
vey under which the plaintiffs claim, being prior in point of time, 
they have the first equitable title, and must prevail . . . unless their 
equity is defeated by the circumstances of the case.”183 He held that 
their equity was not defeated.184 
But Bodley and Brown did not just apply general equitable doc-
trines. For the first time, the Supreme Court confronted, in Mar-
shall’s words, the “inquiry of vast importance whether . . . a court of 
equity acts upon its known, established and general principles, or is 
merely substituted for a court of law.”185 The Court expressly as-
serted a general authority to exercise equity jurisdiction “upon its 
own principles,” that is, “the settled principles of a court of chan-
cery.”186 Marshall reached this conclusion by making four important 
general observations about the equity side of the federal courts. 
First, in Brown, he said that the equity side of the Supreme Court is 
not “merely substituted for a court of law, with no other difference 
than the power of going beyond the patent.”187 Two weeks later, in 
the final Bodley opinion, Marshall made the same point more gen-
erally, saying that a court of chancery is not “by statute, substituted 
in the place of a court of law, with an express grant of jurisdiction 
in the case.”188 In other words, the federal equity court is not a com-
mon law court with limited equity powers (as existed in Pennsylva-
nia, where equity was administered through the common law 
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forms).189 Instead, the equity side of the federal court is a fully-
fledged court of equity, endowed with full chancery powers. 
Second, Marshall repeatedly observed that “the jurisdiction ex-
ercised by a court of chancery is not granted by statute; it is assumed 
by itself,”190 and that jurisdiction “must be exercised upon the 
known principles of equity.”191 He noted that a court of chancery 
“will afford a remedy which a court of law cannot afford, but since 
that remedy is not given by statute, it will be applied by this court as 
the principles of equity require its application.”192 Assuming juris-
diction as a court of chancery, the Court “will pay great respect”—
importantly, Marshall did not say the federal court would be 
bound—“to all those principles which appear to be well established 
in the state in which the lands in controversy lie.”193 The equity side 
of the federal court, then, exercised general equity jurisdiction and 
was not bound by the equity administered by the state. 
Third, Marshall’s vision of federal equity was expansive. The 
existence of equitable jurisdiction did not simply “bring[] the valid-
ity of the entries before the court” to be resolved by the application 
of detailed, technical rules. 194 It also “br[ought] with that question 
every other which defeats the equity of the plaintiff.”195 For exam-
ple, in Bodley, Marshall ordered defendant to convey to plaintiffs 
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land in defendant’s patent but not in his survey.196 This was land to 
which defendant had legal title but which belonged in equity to 
plaintiffs. It turned out, however, that plaintiffs themselves were pa-
tentees over different land in defendant’s prior survey, that is, which 
belonged at law to plaintiffs but in equity to defendant. Marshall 
would have ordered that plaintiffs do the equity that they seek. As 
he put it, the Court would “furnish no equity to [plaintiffs] against 
the legal title which is held by their adversaries, unless they will 
submit to the condition of restoring the lands they have gained by 
the inadvertence of which they complain.”197 Were this a case of 
first impression, then, Marshall would have held that plaintiffs 
“ought not to receive a conveyance for the lands within [defend-
ant’s] survey, and not within his entry, but on the condition of their 
consenting to convey to him the lands they hold which were within 
his entry and are not included in his survey.”198 
Finally, consistent with what Story would say more than thirty 
years later in Swift v. Tyson, Marshall thought that “in questions re-
specting title to real estate especially, the same rule ought certainly 
to prevail in both [federal and state] courts.”199 In Bodley, although 
Marshall was “strongly incline[d]” to require plaintiffs to do the eq-
uity that they sought, he did not.200 Referring to the “very extraordi-
nary state of land title” in Kentucky, he applied the “artificial” prin-
ciple articulated in a series of state court decisions because “[i]t is 
impossible to say how many titles might be shaken by shaking the 
principle.”201 That is so even though “the principle is really settled 
in a manner different from that which this court would deem cor-
rect.”202 The ultimate outcome in Bodley, then, was to grant equita-
ble relief to plaintiffs without requiring them to reciprocate.203 
In the final result, Bodley and Brown were both cases about real 
property and both ultimately applied local law. This is entirely con-
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sistent with Swift, where Story expressly held that federal courts fol-
low state law, not general common law, on “the rights and titles to 
real estate.”204 And unlike Robinson and Howland & Allen, Bodley 
and Brown do not explicitly say that federal equity jurisdiction is 
totally independent of the forum state.205 It is also true that in Bod-
ley, Marshall relied on state law for the conferral of chancery juris-
diction, that is, for “the practice of resorting to a court of chancery 
in order to set up an equitable against the legal title.”206 “[B]ut,” he 
stated, “in the exercise of that [chancery] jurisdiction, [the federal 
court] will proceed according to the principles of equity.”207 In other 
words, the federal court followed state practice on whether chancery 
jurisdiction existed; but in the exercise of that jurisdiction, the fed-
eral court was a fully empowered court of chancery and was not 
bound by state equity doctrine. For his part, Marshall—himself a 
seasoned equity lawyer208—thought he was saying something “of 
vast importance” in concluding that “a court of equity acts upon its 
known, established and general principles.”209 Bodley was argued 
three times in the Supreme Court and it took three years to issue a 
final opinion.210  
The assertion in 1809 of a power to decide federal equity cases 
on general principles coincides with an emboldened Supreme Court 
under Marshall. Just the day before the final Bodley opinion, Mar-
shall delivered Riddle & Co. v. Mandeville.211 Morton Horwitz ar-
gued that in Riddle, Marshall, “out of the blue, had invoked an inde-
pendent equity power to establish the principle of negotiability in 
the federal courts.”212 Riddle “was the first clear assertion in the fed-
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eral courts of the idea that a general commercial law existed inde-
pendently of the decisional law of the states.”213 And just three short 
weeks before the final Bodley opinion, Marshall had delivered “the 
Court’s sweeping assertion of jurisdiction”214 in United States v. Pe-
ters.215 
2. A NATIONAL EQUITY POWER FOR WESTWARD EXPANSION 
Collins explains the evolution of homogeneous federal equity 
after Robinson in terms of the institutional capacity of the federal 
judicial system.216 Although it is tempting to situate homogeneous 
equity in the standard narrative of federal court aggrandizement and 
empowerment, Collins argues that uniform federal equity also 
served an institutional purpose. Homogeneous equity is not simply 
evidence of the concentration of federal court power at the expense 
of the states; it is also “evidence of an effort to ensure litigant equal-
ity and uniform administration of justice throughout the federal ju-
dicial system.”217 In Collins’s view, the failure of the federal courts 
to match westward territorial expansion, and the significant dispar-
ity of state equity, motivated the Court to “use[] uniform equity as 
one way to secure a modicum of horizontal consistency throughout 
the federal judicial system.”218 
3. MATURITY AND ENTRENCHMENT IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 
Homogeneous federal equity came of age during the mid-nine-
teenth century.219 Dane’s first abridgment, published in 1824, cited 
                                                                                                             
 213 Id. 
 214 NEWMYER, supra note 208, at 206–07. 
 215 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 136 (1809). 
 216 See Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation, supra note 8, at 292–98. 
 217 Id. at 300–01. 
 218 Id. at 292–93. 
 219 See generally A. J. PEELER, A TREATISE ON LAW AND EQUITY AS 
DISTINGUISHED AND ENFORCED IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 334 (Aus-
tin, Swindells Printing House 1883); GEO. TUCKER BISPHAM & SHARSWOOD 
BRINTON, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY: A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE 
ADMINISTERED IN COURTS OF CHANCERY 22 (8th ed. 1909); Pratt v. Northam, 19 
F. Cas. 1254, 1258 (C.C.D.R.I. 1828) (No. 11,376); Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6 
Pet.) 648, 658 (1832); Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 655–57 (1835); 
Gordon v. Hobart, 10 F. Cas. 795, 797 (C.C.D. Me. 1836) (No. 5,609); Barber v. 
2017] OUR EQUITY: FEDERALISM AND CHANCERY 209 
 
Howland & Allen for the proposition that “[t]he Federal circuit 
courts have jurisdiction in equity in every State, and in all the same 
powers and rules of decision.”220 By 1850 it was uncontroversial 
that “[t]he chancery jurisdiction given by the Constitution and laws 
of the United States is the same in all the States of the Union, and 
the rule of decision is the same in all.”221 The starkest example of 
homogeneity arose from a couple’s agreement made in contempla-
tion of marriage.222 After the surviving spouse died, the Supreme 
Court of Georgia held that only the couple’s children could sue in 
equity to enforce the marriage agreement.223 The wife’s first cousins 
could not.224 But when the husband’s brother and nephew sued in 
federal court to enforce the agreement—not just the same kind of 
agreement, but the same exact agreement considered in the state 
court proceedings—the U.S. Supreme Court “d[id] not consider 
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T. & J.W. Johnson 1854); ROGER FOSTER, THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY ACTS OF 1875 
AND 1887, at 16–19 (New York, L. K. Strouse & Co. 1887); 1 CHARLES FISK 
BEACH, JR., MODERN EQUITY: COMMENTARIES ON MODERN EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE 7 (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1892); JAMES W. EATON, 
HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 20, 20 n.4 (1901); ARCHIBALD H. 
THROCKMORTON, ILLUSTRATIVE CASES OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 2–3 (1913). 
 220 7 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN 
LAW 557 (Boston, Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 1824). 
 221 BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, FORMS IN CHANCERY, ADMIRALTY, AND AT 
COMMON LAW; ADAPTED TO THE PRACTICE OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 
289 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1842) (quoting Boyle v. Zacharie, 
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 648, 658 (1832)). 
 222 See generally Neves v. Scott (Neves I), 50 U.S. (9 How.) 196, 210, 213 
(1850); Neves v. Scott (Neves II), 54 U.S. (13 How.) 268, 270, 272 (1851). 
 223 Merritt v. Scott, 6 Ga. 563, 573 (1849) (“Equity will not enforce a specific 
performance [of a marriage agreement], at the instance of a volunteer, although 
so near a relation as a brother or sister . . .”). 
 224 Id. at 573–74. 
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th[e] decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia a binding author-
ity,”225 and granted relief.226 The Court asserted the uniformity of 
federal equity principles, saying that “it is for the courts of the 
United States . . . to decide what those principles are, and to apply 
such of them, to each particular case, as they may find justly appli-
cable thereto.”227 The disagreement between the two supreme courts 
was internal to equity doctrine. The federal court noted that “the Su-
preme Court of Georgia, as well as this court, has resorted to the 
decisions of the High Court of Chancery in England, and to ap-
proved writers on equity jurisprudence, as affording the proper 
guides to a correct decision.”228 It was a debate over who was right, 
not who was supreme.229 
The power and persistence of the homogeneous conception of 
federal equity derived from its perceived constitutional status. In 
1832, Justice Story observed that “[t]he Chancery jurisdiction [is] 
given by the constitution and laws of the United States.”230 Its con-
stitutional status was most aggressively asserted by Chief Justice 
Taney in 1850, holding that “the adoption of the State practice must 
not be understood as confounding the principles of law and equity, 
nor as authorizing legal and equitable claims to be blended together 
in one suit,” because “[t]he Constitution of the United States, in cre-
ating and defining the judicial power of the general government, es-
tablishes this distinction between law and equity.”231 Taney’s opin-
ion underwrote the constitutional entrenchment of the law/equity 
distinction for decades.232 
                                                                                                             
 225 Neves II, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 272. 
 226 Id. at 273. 
 227 Id. at 272. 
 228 Id. 
 229 The Supreme Court of Georgia later adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s ap-
proach even though it was not required to do so. Cartledge v. Cutliff, 29 Ga. 758, 
766–67 (1860). 
 230 Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 648, 658 (1832). 
 231 Bennett v. Butterworth, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 669, 674–75 (1850). 
 232 See, e.g., Fenn v. Holme, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 481, 485 (1858); Thompson 
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1903); Gray v. Grand Trunk W. Ry. Co., 156 F. 736, 741 (7th Cir. 1907); Union 
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4. FEDERAL RIGHTS 
a. Private Law 
Today federal courts apply homogeneous equity when enforcing 
federal rights.233 One year after Guaranty Trust, Frankfurter distin-
guished “the duty of a federal court, sitting as it were as a court of a 
State, to approximate as closely as may be State law in order to vin-
dicate without discrimination a right derived solely from a State,” 
from “the duty of federal courts, sitting as national courts throughout 
the country, to apply their own principles in enforcing an equitable 
right created by Congress.”234 And since 1999, the battle over fed-
eral equity has occurred on territory staked out by Grupo Mexi-
cano.235 In that case, the Supreme Court held that federal courts 
lacked power to issue an injunction restraining defendants from 
dealing with assets pending resolution of the lawsuit—what is 
known elsewhere as a Mareva injunction.236 Plaintiffs, concerned 
about defendant’s imminent insolvency, secured a preliminary in-
junction enjoining defendant from dealing with its remaining sub-
stantial asset.237 Justice Scalia, writing for a bare majority, held that 
the district court had acted beyond its equitable authority because 
such orders were unknown to the High Court of Chancery in Eng-
land in 1789.238 He also suggested that the authority to issue such 
injunctions “could render Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64, which 
                                                                                                             
249 F. 296, 298 (2d Cir. 1918); Woodlawn Farm Dairy Co. v. Erie R.R. Co., 282 
F. 278, 279 (M.D. Pa. 1921); Trubenizing Process Corp. v. Jacobson, 10 F. Supp. 
655, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). 
 233 See e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395–98 (1946). 
 234 Id. at 395; see also id. at 397 (“We conclude that the decision in the York 
case is inapplicable to the enforcement of federal equitable rights.”). 
 235 See generally Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, 
Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999). 
 236 See id. at 333; see also Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. Int’l Bulkcarriers 
S.A. [1980] 1 All E.R. 213, 213, 214–15 (Eng.). 
 237 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 312–13. 
 238 Id. at 333. This view has long pedigree. See Baker v. Biddle, 2 F. Cas. 439, 
447–48, 452–53 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 764) (“We cannot adopt any rules or 
principles of the law, which are in contradiction to those which were settled and 
established before the Revolution.”). 
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authorizes use of state prejudgment remedies, a virtual irrele-
vance.”239 Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, thought that this was “an un-
justifiably static conception of equity jurisdiction.”240 The debate 
between Scalia and Ginsburg was methodological, and Scalia’s his-
torical approach prevailed.241 
The Court’s recent equity jurisprudence has been dominated by 
ERISA’s authorization of “appropriate equitable relief.”242 Since 
2002, the Court has decided five cases interpreting that statutory 
phrase and, with one exception, those cases present the same general 
fact pattern: a health plan fiduciary brings a claim against a tort-
award-winning beneficiary seeking monetary reimbursement for 
medical expenses that the plan had paid on the beneficiary’s be-
half.243 Because compensatory damages are quintessentially a legal 
remedy, fiduciaries must characterize their claim as typically avail-
able in equity244—for example, the enforcement of a lien or equita-
ble restitution. To determine whether the fiduciary’s request for re-
imbursement is an example of “appropriate equitable relief,” the 
Court consults “standard treatises on equity, which establish ‘the 
                                                                                                             
 239 Id. at 330–31. Of course, Scalia’s reasoning only works if state law pro-
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 240 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 336 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 241 See Bray, supra note 110, at 1011; see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing 
Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32, 34–35 (2004) (observing that the dispute 
between Justice Ginsburg and Justice Scalia over originalist methodology was il-
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L. REV. 1318, 1317–21 (2003). 
 243 Compare Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 
206, 208 (2002), and Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 359 
(2006), and US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537, 1543–44 (2013), 
and Montanile v. Bd. of Trs. of Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 136 S. 
Ct. 651, 655–56 (2016), with CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 424–25 
(2011) (claim brought by beneficiaries of pension plan challenging fiduciary’s 
adoption of a new plan partly on the basis that fiduciary’s disclosures had failed 
to give proper notice of changes to benefits, which in certain respects were less 
generous). 
 244 See, e.g., Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210. 
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basic contours’ of what equitable relief was typically available in 
premerger equity courts.”245 
b. Public Law 
In public law, Owen Fiss explicitly recognized the interaction 
between equity and federalism, and he protested the Supreme 
Court’s invocation of the vocabulary of equity to obscure decisions 
that were really about federalism.246 In Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 
for example, the Court reversed the district court’s order enjoining 
the city and its mayor from enforcing an unconstitutional solicitation 
ordinance.247 The Court deployed the “familiar rule that courts of 
equity do not ordinarily restrain criminal prosecutions” to enforce 
Congress’s “policy . . . of leaving generally to the state courts the 
trial of criminal cases arising under state laws, subject to review by 
this Court of any federal questions involved.”248 Absent exceptional 
circumstances—defined in traditionally equitable terms as prevent-
ing clear and imminent irreparable injury—a federal equity court 
should refuse “to interfere with or embarrass threatened proceedings 
in state courts.”249 And “equitable remedies infringing this inde-
pendence of the states—though they might otherwise be given—
should be withheld if sought on slight or inconsequential 
grounds.”250 For Fiss, these are “statement[s] about the structure of 
American federalism cast in the language of equity,” which 
“claimed both that a vital principle of federalism was threatened by 
the injunctive suit, and that the doctrines of equity should be used to 
protect that principle.”251 Ultimately, Fiss argued, using the rhetoric 
and “doctrines of equity—doctrines forged in the battles of English 
                                                                                                             
 245 Montanile, 136 S. Ct. at 657 (quoting Great-West, 534 U.S. at 217). Sam-
uel Bray has argued that the Court’s approach to ERISA’s authorization of equi-
table relief is characterized by invoking the tradition of equity, but that this tradi-
tion is, in fact, a judicially constructed ideal. See generally Bray, supra note 124, 
at 1014–16, 1022. 
 246 Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1103–12, 1116–119, 1121 
(1977). 
 247 Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 159–60, 166 (1943). 
 248 Id. at 163. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Fiss, supra note 246, at 1106–07. 
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Chancery—to further views of federalism, a political principle cen-
tral to American government . . . . was a kind of legal prestidigita-
tion.”252 And, as Douglas Laycock eloquently detailed, the Supreme 
Court got the equitable doctrine wrong.253 
Fiss’s primary target was Dombrowski v. Pfister, which author-
ized a federal court to enjoin state criminal prosecutions forming 
part of a plan of arrests, seizures and threats of prosecution that were 
designed to harass and discourage the vindication of constitutional 
rights.254 The Court held that, on the facts presented, irreparable in-
jury was established and an injunction should issue.255 Thus, Fiss 
noted, “[t]he linkage between the two realms of discourse—federal-
ism and equity—was preserved” from Douglas.256 The equitable 
doctrines, however, “were reinterpreted” and “made to bend to a 
new vision of federalism, one that posited the federal courts as the 
primary guardian of constitutional rights.”257 One of Fiss’s basic 
points is that this reasoning is doubletalk: “[t]hough steeped in the 
language of equitable remedies, Dombrowski was of course not a 
struggle about remedies but about judges.”258 In its appeal to the ir-
reparable injury rule, Dombrowski “suggests that a point is being 
made about remedies, when in truth a point is being made about the 
structure of the federal system, one that stands independent of the 
remedy.”259 Dombrowski’s “altered vision of federalism . . . re-
mained submerged, silent beneath the smooth manipulation of eq-
uity doctrine.”260 Fiss praised the tendency of later cases to cast off 
the “shackles of . . . the ill-founded tradition of using the language 
of equity to safeguard federal structure.”261 
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 253 See Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The 
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This tactic—manipulating equitable doctrine to safeguard feder-
alism—is as old as the Republic. Laycock observed that it dates at 
least to Ex parte Young, decided in 1908.262 Part IV demonstrates 
that the Supreme Court used equity to reinforce federalism as early 
as 1793. To be sure, the early federal courts did not deploy equity to 
position themselves as the primary guardian of constitutional rights; 
instead they used equity to signal the continued dominance of the 
states.263 Nevertheless, the early federal courts reinforced the nas-
cent federalism using an equitable vocabulary.264 
B. Heterogeneous Federal Equity 
For the federal courts, 1938 was a big year. In April, the Court 
decided Erie, and in September the new Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure came into effect.265 Promulgated pursuant to the Rules Ena-
bling Act of 1934, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure realized the 
Act’s conferral of authority on the Court to “unite the general rules 
prescribed by [the Court] for cases in equity with those in actions at 
law so as to secure one form of civil action and procedure for 
both.”266 Justice Brandeis wrote the Court’s opinion in Erie,267 but 
was the only Justice who expressed disapproval of the adoption of 
the Rules.268 The Rules and Erie effected a revolution, procedurally 
                                                                                                             
 262 See Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The 
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 265 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938). See generally 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 113TH CONG., FED. R. CIV. PRO. WITH FORMS, vii 
(Comm. Print 2014). 
 266 Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73–415, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)). 
 267 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 64. 
 268 See Letter from Charles E. Hughes, Chief Justice of the United States Su-
preme Court, to Homer Cummings, Attorney Gen. (Dec. 20, 1937), 308 U.S. 649, 
649 (“I am requested to state that Mr. Justice Brandeis does not approve of the 
adoption of the rules.”); see also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE 
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF 
THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 135–36 (2000). 
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and substantively, in federal equity.269 An immediate consequence 
was the abolition of the separate common law and equity sides of 
the federal courts. And, after Guaranty Trust, federal courts enforc-
ing state-created rights applied state rather than federal equity.270 
Erie holds that, absent applicable federal law, substantive state 
law (including the decisions of the state’s courts) governs state 
claims litigated in federal court.271 Erie operates primarily in diver-
sity cases; in general, federal courts apply state law when enforcing 
state rights of action.272 And of course, Erie is more than the com-
mand that state law governs substantive issues in diversity cases: it 
repudiated federal general common law.273 It approved Justice 
Holmes’s criticism of Swift v. Tyson as resting on the invalid as-
sumption that there is “a transcendental body of law outside of any 
particular State but obligatory within it.”274 In Guaranty Trust, 
Frankfurter said that Erie “did not merely overrule a venerable 
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 272 See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); see 
also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988); Houben v. Telular Corp., 309 
F.3d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 273 “There is no federal general common law.” Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 274 Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yel-
low Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
2017] OUR EQUITY: FEDERALISM AND CHANCERY 217 
 
case,” but “overruled a particular way of looking at law.”275 Erie 
“implicates, indeed perhaps it is, the very essence of our federal-
ism.”276 What then is equity’s place in Erie’s conception of judicial 
federalism? Is equity a particular way of looking at law that is irrec-
oncilable with Erie? Is it inescapably a transcendental body of law 
outside of any particular state but obligatory within it? 
1. GUARANTY TRUST CO. V. YORK: EQUITY AND ERIE 
In Guaranty Trust, Frankfurter confronted the question of 
whether, in a suit brought on its equity side, a federal district court 
sitting in diversity was required to apply the state’s statute of limi-
tations. Petitioner Guaranty Trust, a trustee with power and obliga-
tions to enforce rights of noteholders in a third-party corporation, 
cooperated in a plan for the cash purchase of notes.277 The offer was 
to exchange each note for half its face value plus twenty shares.278 
Non-accepting noteholders brought a class action, solely based on 
diversity, alleging breach of trust by petitioner in failing to protect 
noteholders’ interests when it assented to the exchange offer, and in 
failing to disclose its own interest when sponsoring the offer.279 The 
Second Circuit held that the district court sitting in diversity was 
“not required to apply the State statute of limitations that would gov-
ern like suits in” state court.280 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Frankfurter’s opin-
ion divided in half. The first half brimmed with theory and history, 
and established that Erie applies to equity cases. Frankfurter reimag-
ined Erie as a comprehensive legal philosophy. In stark contrast to 
Brandeis’s concise and “perhaps even gnomic” opinion in Erie,281 
Frankfurter swooped from jurisprudential heights. Swift v. Tyson, he 
said, embodied “a particular way of looking at law which dominated 
the judicial process long after its inadequacies had been laid 
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bare.”282 In 1842, “Law was conceived as a ‘brooding omnipres-
ence’ of Reason, of which decisions were merely evidence and not 
themselves the controlling formulations.”283 Federal diversity courts 
were “free to ascertain what Reason, and therefore Law, required 
wholly independent of authoritatively declared State law.”284 This 
“impulse to freedom” was “strongly rooted in . . . the nature of 
law.”285 Swift, then, “summed up prior attitudes and expressions” 
and “was congenial to the jurisprudential climate of the time.”286 It 
held that “State court decisions were not ‘the law’ but merely some-
one’s opinion . . . concerning the content of this all-pervading law,” 
and “federal courts assumed power to find for themselves the con-
tent of such a body of law.”287 
This may, of course, correctly encapsulate the “jurisprudential 
climate” of the 1840s.288 But Erie said none of it. To be sure, 
Brandeis famously held that “[t]here is no federal general common 
law.”289 Yet the closest Brandeis got to waxing lyrical about juris-
prudential climates were a few quotes from Holmes, including that 
“law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist 
without some definite authority behind it.”290 In Guaranty Trust, 
however, Frankfurter simply needed to establish a major premise: 
Swift embodied antiquated nineteenth-century views about the na-
ture of law. And if Swift represented a conception of law, Erie must 
represent its philosophical opposite. 
Frankfurter then linked homogeneous federal equity to Swift. 
Recognizing the deep doctrinal pedigree of homogeneous federal 
equity, Frankfurter noted that Swift “was merely another expression 
of the ideas put forth in the equity cases.”291 Federal equity courts 
were particularly sympathetic to “sentiments for uniformity of deci-
sion and freedom from diversity in State law . . . because equitable 
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doctrines are so often cast in terms of universal applicability.”292 
Logically, this was sufficient to decide the case: homogeneous eq-
uity was a manifestation of Swift’s conception of law, which Erie 
overruled. 
But Frankfurter went further, making the strong historical claim 
that federal diversity courts, “in the long course of their history, have 
not differentiated in their regard for State law between actions at law 
and suits in equity.”293 The Rules of Decision Act, he explained, 
“was deemed, consistently for over a hundred years, to be merely 
declaratory of what would in any event have governed the federal 
courts and therefore was equally applicable to equity suits.”294 This 
strong historical claim depended crucially on Frankfurter’s distinc-
tion between rights and remedies. On state-created rights, he argued, 
“Congress never gave, nor did the federal courts ever claim, the 
power to deny substantive rights created by State law or to create 
substantive rights denied by State law.”295 On remedies, things were 
different. “This does not mean,” he cautioned, “that whatever equi-
table remedy is available in a State court must be available in a di-
versity suit in a federal court, or conversely, that a federal court may 
not afford an equitable remedy not available in a State court.”296 
There are well-known constitutional and statutory limitations on eq-
uity in federal courts.297 It follows, said Frankfurter, that states can-
not define the remedies a federal diversity court “must” give, and 
that a federal diversity court “may” give equitable relief when a state 
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court cannot.298 Federal diversity courts enforced state-created 
rights “if the mode of proceeding and remedy were consonant with 
the traditional body of equitable remedies, practice and proce-
dure.”299 
Frankfurter thus adeptly deployed a strikingly impoverished 
conception of equity by maintaining an artificially sharp distinction 
between rights and remedies, and cramming homogeneous federal 
equity into an artificially narrow remedial domain. He paid lip ser-
vice to the “good deal of talk in the cases that federal equity is a 
separate legal system”300 and to the “talk of freedom of equity from 
. . . State statutes of limitations.”301 He approved “[d]icta . . . char-
acterizing equity as an independent body of law.”302 Frankfurter’s 
vision of equity, however, was merely remedial because “this sys-
tem of equity ‘derived its doctrines, as well as its powers, from its 
mode of giving relief.’”303 A homogeneous conception of federal 
equity only existed in this limited domain of equitable remedial 
rights. 
The second half of Frankfurter’s opinion articulated a cryptic, 
“outcome-determinative” standard for applying Erie.304 Eschewing 
a general substance/procedure distinction, Frankfurter phrased the 
Erie test in a few different ways: litigation in federal court cannot 
“substantially affect the enforcement of the right” or “significantly 
affect the outcome of a litigation” or “lead to a substantially differ-
ent result.”305 Erie, said Frankfurter, expressed a “policy” that “the 
outcome of the litigation . . . should be substantially the same, so far 
as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if 
tried in a State court.”306 He cataloged some of the legal rules gov-
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erned by state law: burden of proof, conflict of laws, and contribu-
tory negligence.307 Similarly, he held, because a statute of limitation 
“bears on a State-created right vitally and not merely formally or 
negligibly,” and enacts “consequences that so intimately affect re-
covery or non-recovery,” federal diversity courts should follow state 
law.308 
Understandably, the consistency of the equitable remedial rights 
doctrine and the outcome-determinative test drew skepticism.309 
Most important for current purposes, though, is that Frankfurter 
“eviscerated the federal uniform equity doctrine, largely ending eq-
uity’s reign as a distinctive site of nonstate, judge-made law in fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction cases.”310 In a phone call to Frankfurter, 
Chief Justice Stone lauded his “considerable surgical operation” 
which excised “a good deal more of historical material . . . than the 
uninformed reader might realize.”311 
2. LEGAL PROGRESSIVISM 
Collins has eloquently chronicled Frankfurter’s central role in 
the diminution of federal equity.312 Frankfurter waged a decades-
long scholarly and political campaign against diversity jurisdiction 
and federal equity. Frankfurter published work, encouraged stu-
dents, and agitated Congress in pursuit of two intertwined goals: 
abolish diversity jurisdiction and limit federal equity.313 There were 
larger political objectives. From at least the late 1920s, as Brandeis’s 
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“de facto agent,”314 Frankfurter had “drap[ed] his legal Progressiv-
ism in neutral scientific and professional language.”315 Diversity ju-
risdiction and the general common law it enforced favored corporate 
interests;316 and equitable injunctions enjoined industrial action, ef-
fectively conscripting workers.317 In Brandeis’s memorable phrase, 
the labor injunction “reminds of involuntary servitude.”318 Frankfur-
ter gratefully received the opportunity presented by Guaranty Trust 
to limit diversity jurisdiction and federal equity in one fell swoop. 
3. CONCEPTUAL TROUBLES: ERIE’S CHANCERY PROBLEM 
Frankfurter grounded a federal diversity court’s equitable pow-
ers wholly on a line plucked from Langdell’s treatise: “this system 
of equity ‘derived its doctrines, as well as its powers, from its mode 
of giving relief.’”319 But that is not the whole story, as Langdell him-
self emphasized: 
Of course, however, it must not be supposed that eq-
uity in modern times is simply a different system of 
remedies from those administered in courts of law; 
for there are many extensive doctrines in equity, and 
some whole branches of law, which are unknown to 
the common-law courts.320 
The first edition of Hart and Wechsler’s famous casebook 
quoted this passage but then observed that “traditional equity was 
not . . . a system merely of distinctive remedies without distinctive 
substantive consequences.”321 Hart and Wechsler highlighted “fa-
miliar examples, such as trusts,” and “also the many equitable de-
fenses, enforced by separate bill in equity, by which the chancellor, 
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having as always the last word, destroyed interests which the law 
did recognize, so as to reach a wholly different substantive re-
sult.”322 If equity is remedial, as Frankfurter held, then it is hard to 
see how any remedy or remedial doctrine is not outcome-determi-
native, unless outcome is taken to “refer only to which party pre-
vails, and not to the form of relief given.”323 Equity is outcome-de-
terminative vis-à-vis the common law, “[a]nd once the general prin-
ciple was transposed into the federal system, equity was by its very 
nature outcome determinative vis-à-vis state law.”324 
Frankfurter’s remedial conception of equity was not only de-
scriptively wrong but normatively vulnerable. Henry Hart suggested 
a defense of homogeneous federal equity by reference to a 1915 di-
versity case, Guffey v. Smith.325 In Guffey, holders of an oil and gas 
lease with an option to surrender sought to enjoin operations under 
a later lease.326 Illinois courts did not enforce in equity an oil and 
gas lease containing an option to surrender.327 The Supreme Court 
afforded equitable relief, appealing to homogeneous federal eq-
uity.328 After Guaranty Trust cast serious doubt on the continued 
vitality of Guffey,329 Hart famously wondered: 
Can Guffey be defended on the ground that the fed-
eral court was merely giving a fuller and fairer rem-
edy in the enforcement of state-created rights and ob-
ligations than the state courts would give? Does it of-
fend the constitutional plan, or any valid principle of 
federalism, to have the federal courts administer in 
favor of diverse citizens, this kind of juster justice? 
An affirmative answer would require, would it not, a 
root-and-branch repudiation of the tradition of fed-
eral equity in its positive aspects?330 
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For Hart, the equity jurisdiction of federal diversity courts empow-
ered them to enforce state-created rights better than the state courts 
themselves.331 A federal equity court would thereby vindicate the 
very purpose of diversity jurisdiction.332 Frankfurter’s remedial con-
ception not only narrowed the word “equity” used in Article III and 
the first Judiciary Act,333 it also frustrated the point of diversity ju-
risdiction. 
After Frankfurter’s intervention in Guaranty Trust, it is not ob-
vious that federal diversity courts, deprived of the ability to admin-
ister a juster justice, are capable of sitting as courts of equity. Erie 
took aim at the “doctrine of Swift v. Tyson,”334 where Justice Story 
held that principles of general commercial law (the law merchant) 
were not “laws of the several states” to which the Rules of Decision 
Act referred.335 Federal courts, said Story, could decide questions of 
general common law independently of the states.336 The Rules of 
Decision Act did not apply “to questions of a more general nature,” 
such as “the construction of ordinary contracts or other written in-
struments,” or to “questions of general commercial law,” where an-
swers were to be found “not in the decisions of the local tribunals, 
but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurispru-
dence.”337 That is because neither federal nor state courts could 
claim authority over the general common law. In that domain: 
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[T]he state tribunals are called upon to perform the 
like functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon 
general reasoning and legal analogies, what is the 
true exposition of the contract or instrument, or what 
is the just rule furnished by the principles of com-
mercial law to govern the case . . . . Undoubtedly, the 
decision of the local tribunals upon such subjects are 
entitled to, and will receive, the most deliberate at-
tention and respect of this Court; but they cannot fur-
nish positive rules, or conclusive authority, by which 
our own judgments are to be bound up and gov-
erned.338 
Story’s description of the general common law aligns with his 
conception of federal equity. Ten years before he wrote the Swift 
opinion, Story said that the exercise of equity jurisdiction in federal 
court “was to be decided by the general principles of courts of eq-
uity, and not by any peculiar statute enactments of the State.”339 By 
1850, the Supreme Court had fully internalized the analogy. On eq-
uitable principles, both state and federal courts “resort[] to the deci-
sions of the High Court of Chancery in England, and to approved 
writers on equity jurisprudence, as affording the proper guides to a 
correct decision.”340 But “it is for the courts of the United States, 
and for this court in the last resort, to decide what those principles 
are, and to apply such of them, to each particular case, as they may 
find justly applicable thereto.”341 And “we do not consider this de-
cision of the [state court] a binding authority.”342 
Frankfurter seized on this in Guaranty Trust and held that ho-
mogeneous federal equity was hopelessly incompatible with Erie’s 
vision of judicial federalism. As noted in Part III.B.1, Frankfurter 
thought that Swift itself was merely a symptom of the homogeneity 
expressed by federal courts of equity. The devastating Holmesian 
aphorisms followed thick and fast: uniform federal equity was just 
                                                                                                             
 338 Id. 
 339 Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 648, 658 (1832). 
 340 See, e.g., Neves II, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 268, 271 (1851). 
 341 Id. at 272. 
 342 Id. 
226 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:176 
 
another brooding omnipresence and transcendental body.343 The 
true position, said Frankfurter, is that “a federal court adjudicating a 
State-created right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of 
the parties is for that purpose, in effect, only another court of the 
State.”344 
Guaranty Trust, in dictating that federal equity courts sitting in 
diversity must slavishly follow state law, certainly made the “occa-
sion for the enforcement of equitable doctrine” a rare occurrence.345 
Henry Smith’s functional account of equity demonstrates this.346 
Equity, Smith argues, is a second-order intervention to deal with 
complex and uncertain problems like opportunism.347 It is second-
order because it is “law about law”: equity takes as given the result 
at common law, and modifies or supplements that result according 
to its institutionalized conscience.348 Complex problems like oppor-
tunism, which cannot be captured ex ante, are amenable to second-
order intervention.349 Smith cautions against a comprehensive pro-
cedural merger of law and equity because it makes equity first-order 
rather than second-order.350 The result is a “flattening” of reme-
dies,351 where equity’s traditionally second-order intervention is re-
placed by multifactor tests and standards—“the closest mono-level 
substitute for a second-order safety valve.”352 The federal courts, as 
long as they retained status as a separate court system, had scope to 
implement a second-order check on state law. In Guaranty Trust, 
Frankfurter did all he could to deprive the federal diversity courts of 
their ability to act as a second-order check.353 Positioning a federal 
equity court sitting in diversity as simply another court of the state 
                                                                                                             
 343 Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102–03 (1945). 
 344 Id. 
 345 Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 171 N.E. 884, 887 (N.Y. 1930) (Cardozo, C.J., 
dissenting) (“Equity follows the law, but not slavishly nor always. If it did, there 
could never be occasion for the enforcement of equitable doctrine.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 346 See generally Smith, supra note 55, at 175–76, 185–88. 
 347 Id. at 184. 
 348 Id. at 175–76, 181–82. 
 349 See id. 175–76, 180–81, 184. 
 350 Id. at 185–87. 
 351 Id. at 193–95. 
 352 Id. at 188. 
 353 See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945). 
2017] OUR EQUITY: FEDERALISM AND CHANCERY 227 
 
deprives the court of its power to launch a second-order interven-
tion. 
Of course, if state courts take a traditionally equitable approach 
to a state statute of limitations, then a federal court, sitting in diver-
sity, is entitled to do likewise. But to a certain extent, even this ver-
sion of equitable power is illusory. It is, first, solely contingent on 
the state’s continuing commitment to traditional equity.354 Second, 
it nevertheless cabins the federal court’s discretion and changes the 
nature of the federal court’s inquiry. Under Guaranty Trust’s regime 
of heterogeneous federal equity, the standard of correctness for an 
equitable decision is necessarily pegged to the state. To paraphrase 
Story, the federal diversity courts are not ascertaining upon general 
reasoning and legal analogies the just rule furnished by the princi-
ples of equity to govern the case.355 Instead, they put themselves in 
the shoes of a legal fiction: an ideal construct of a state court. The 
federal equity court sitting in diversity does not ask, “What is equi-
table?” It asks, “What would a state court think is equitable?”356 
The argument should not be pushed too far. Samuel Bray has 
argued that federal courts construct an ideal vision of equity even in 
federal question cases, and there may be no real difference between 
constructing an ideal doctrine and constructing an ideal court apply-
ing some variation of that doctrine.357 Perhaps, too, the common law 
method itself can be abstractly described as courts constructing an 
ideal doctrine. For current purposes, it suffices to observe that fed-
eral equity courts seem to engage in different inquiries when exer-
cising diversity and federal question jurisdiction; and when sitting 
in diversity, they cannot decide equitable doctrine based on their 
                                                                                                             
 354 See, e.g., Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 500 (2d Cir. 1953) (“If the 
highest court of a State rules that, in a certain class of cases, equity is stripped of 
all discretion and must always grant, automatically, a perpetual injunction, then 
(say my colleagues) thanks to Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. York, a 
federal court, sitting in that State in a diversity case falling within that class of 
cases, must likewise surrender all discretion and mechanically issue a perpetual 
injunction.”) (Frank, J., dissenting as to the nature of the relief) (citation omitted). 
 355 Cf. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842). 
 356 Henry Hart observed in 1954 that “recent Supreme Court decisions . . . ask 
only what the courts of the state in which the federal court is sitting would do.” 
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. 
REV. 489, 511 n.75 (1954). 
 357 See Bray, supra note 110, at 1001. 
228 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:176 
 
own principles—they must defer. Federal diversity courts, therefore, 
are limited-purpose courts of equity: they are courts of equity only 
to the extent state courts are. 
Not everyone shares the view that Guaranty Trust strengthened 
Erie and shoehorned federal equity into an artificially narrow reme-
dial conception. In a recent paper, Michael Morley contended the 
opposite: Guaranty Trust “confirmed the vitality of independent 
federal equity law” by “preserv[ing] the ‘equitable remedial rights 
doctrine,’ which requires federal courts to apply a uniform body of 
federal equitable principles . . . rather than state law, to decide 
whether to grant equitable relief.”358 Finding “no basis under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal law, or the U.S. Constitu-
tion for federal courts to apply a freestanding, independent body of 
equitable principles to resolve all remedial issues” when enforcing 
state-created rights, Morley argued for an absolute rule in diversity 
cases that federal courts should always apply state law when decid-
ing whether to provide equitable relief.359 He proposed what he 
called a “new vision of the federal equity power: equity follows the 
law.”360 Under this “new” vision, federal courts apply homogeneous 
equity when enforcing federal rights, and heterogeneous equity 
when enforcing state rights. 
Morley argued that Guaranty Trust’s preservation of the equita-
ble remedial rights doctrine is inconsistent with Erie, insisting that 
Frankfurter’s opinion “required federal courts to apply a uniform 
body of equitable principles . . . when deciding whether to grant eq-
uitable relief in cases arising under state law.”361 But this overreads 
Guaranty Trust. In fact, Guaranty Trust reconciled Erie and the eq-
uitable remedial rights doctrine by minimizing the latter: state law 
governs whether to grant equitable relief, except in the small minor-
ity of cases where equitable relief would not substantially affect the 
enforcement of a state-created right.362 The first half of Frankfurter’s 
opinion established that Erie applies in equity cases. It held, too, that 
Erie preserved a power of federal diversity courts to apply federal 
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law when deciding whether to grant equitable relief. But the second 
half of the opinion tightly circumscribed that power: it cannot sub-
stantially affect the enforcement of the right or significantly affect 
the outcome of the litigation. This gutted the equitable remedial 
rights doctrine. Equitable doctrines and remedies supplement the 
common law, so they often materially affect the litigation. Of 
course, “substantially affect the enforcement of the right,”363 and 
“significantly affect the result of a litigation,”364 are not the most 
precise formulations. Frankfurter offered little guidance, but it is 
clear that he put the significant modification of a state remedy in the 
same category as a denial of the state remedy.365 Frankfurter, guided 
by Erie, stringently limited the equitable remedial rights doctrine. 
The very result of Guaranty Trust shows that it depleted federal 
equity in diversity cases. Frankfurter held that a federal court sitting 
in diversity is bound by a state statute of limitations because the stat-
ute “bears on a State-created right vitally and not merely formally 
or negligibly”366 and enacts “consequences that so intimately affect 
recovery or non-recovery.”367 Before Guaranty Trust, however, fed-
eral diversity courts took the traditional equitable approach to state 
statutes of limitation. Frankfurter described this approach in a non-
diversity case decided a year after Guaranty Trust.368 “Traditionally 
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and for good reasons,” Frankfurter said, “statutes of limitation are 
not controlling measures of equitable relief.”369 The “historic prin-
ciples of equity” took cognizance of statutes of limitation “solely for 
the light they may shed in determining that which is decisive for the 
chancellor’s intervention, namely, whether the plaintiff has inexcus-
ably slept on his rights so as to make a decree against the defendant 
unfair.”370 Guaranty Trust’s curbing of equity in federal diversity 
courts thus entailed the elimination of what Frankfurter called “the 
old chancery rule” regarding statutes of limitation, which “this Court 
long ago adopted as its own.”371 
Subsequent cases verify that Guaranty Trust did not “confirm[] 
the vitality of independent federal equity law,” nor did it preserve a 
broad equitable remedial rights doctrine.372 The clearest example, 
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, was decided in 1956.373 
Both Justice Douglas for the Court and Frankfurter writing sepa-
rately refused to apply the equitable remedial rights doctrine. De-
fendant had removed, on diversity grounds, a state law employment 
contract case to the federal court.374 Defendant moved for a stay to 
specifically enforce the arbitration clause.375 But under state law, an 
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agreement to arbitrate was revocable prior to an award, and there-
fore could not be specifically enforced.376 The Second Circuit held 
that Erie did not apply, arguing that arbitration was merely another 
form of trial.377 Douglas disagreed, applying Guaranty Trust’s hold-
ing that a federal diversity court “may not ‘substantially affect the 
enforcement of the right as given by the State.’”378 He wrote that 
“remedy by arbitration . . . substantially affects the cause of action 
created by the State.”379 Frankfurter separately agreed “that the dif-
ferences between arbitral and judicial determination of a contro-
versy under a contract sufficiently go to the merits of the outcome” 
to engage Erie.380 Because the equitable remedy of specific perfor-
mance “vitally and not merely formally or negligibly” affected en-
forcement of the state-created right, Guaranty Trust required appli-
cation of state law.381 Scholarship confirmed the limited scope of the 
equitable remedial rights doctrine after Guaranty Trust.382 
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The rigid narrowness of Guaranty Trust’s equitable remedial 
rights doctrine robs Morley’s critique of its sting. Contrary to Mor-
ley’s argument, the equitable remedial rights doctrine does not per-
mit federal diversity courts to “apply a uniform set of equitable prin-
ciples to all cases,”383 nor “establish their own bodies of equitable 
principles applicable to all cases,”384 nor “establish a national code 
of equitable remedial principles as a matter of substantive law.”385 
It is one thing to say that federal diversity courts have no authority 
to establish a substantive national code of equity. But it is quite an-
other to deny the authority of a federal diversity court to issue a pre-
liminary injunction under federal law to prevent the frustration of 
the federal judicial process.386 In Part V, I argue that, consistently 
with Erie, some genuine preliminary injunctions fall within the very 
limited operation of the equitable remedial rights doctrine. 
IV. FACILITATIVE EQUITY: A THIRD CONCEPTION OF FEDERAL 
EQUITY 
Concluding that homogeneous federal equity was inconsistent 
with Erie, Frankfurter aggressively enforced Erie in equity cases. 
But there was a road not taken. In the early years of the Republic, 
before 1809, federal equity courts asserted neither a strong inde-
pendent power to administer equity solely on their own principles 
nor an equity jurisdiction tightly bounded by the states. Instead, fed-
eral courts capitalized on the flexibility of equity and its facilitative 
nature. Recent work has highlighted modern equity’s strongly facil-
itative character.387 Of course, equity has long facilitated the con-
venient or effective enforcement of common law rights.388 The quia 
                                                                                                             
 383 Morley, supra note 358, at 3. 
 384 Id. at 54. 
 385 Id. at 53. 
 386 In 1954, Henry Hart posed the question: “Could [a federal district court in 
a diversity case] deny a remedy which [state] courts would grant?” He said that 
the answer “would seem in principle to be yes, of course—providing the federal 
courts merely decline to adjudicate and do not purport to settle substantive rights 
inconsistently with applicable state law.” Hart, supra note 356, at 511–512 n.75. 
 387 P.G. Turner, Equity and Administration, in EQUITY AND ADMINISTRATION, 
supra note 29, at 2–3. 
 388 See HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 11–12. 
2017] OUR EQUITY: FEDERALISM AND CHANCERY 233 
 
timet injunction, interpleader, and discovery are only three exam-
ples; they demonstrate the importance of the equitable function in 
aiding the enforcement of legal rights.389 
This Part will outline three ways in which early federal courts 
deployed equity to facilitate the practical functioning of the nascent 
federal judiciary, taking care not to encroach on state interests and 
activities. First, in one of its earliest decisions, the Supreme Court 
issued an injunction to stay execution of a circuit court judgment at 
law, solely to allow a state to pursue its legal rights in federal 
court.390 Second, a circuit court refused to exercise diversity juris-
diction after an equitable bill of discovery revealed that diversity 
among the parties had been fraudulently manufactured.391 Third, 
federal equity courts deferred to a state’s interpretation of its own 
statute, even if they thought the interpretation wrong.392 After 1809, 
as federal court procedure became more settled and the Supreme 
Court consolidated its judicial power—including the previously un-
noticed talk in Bodley and Brown about federal courts exercising 
equity jurisdiction on their own principles—federal equity transi-
tioned from a subservient facilitative conception to the more robust 
homogeneous conception. 
After explaining the legal doctrine,393 this Part situates facilita-
tive federal equity in its historical context.394 Just as homogeneous 
federal equity served the goals of a country bent on westward conti-
nental expansion, and heterogeneity served Frankfurter’s progres-
sive politics, so facilitative federal equity was deployed for a larger 
purpose. The federal courts’ facilitative equity—especially the tra-
ditional facilitative jurisdiction in aid of legal rights—played an im-
portant administrative and nation-building role in an era where the 
states were the powerful stakeholders in the young federalism. It is 
                                                                                                             
 389 See, e.g., Buskirk v. King, 72 F. 22, 25 (4th Cir. 1896); Sanders v. Armour 
Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190, 200 (1934); Ex parte Boyd, 105 U.S. 647, 657–
58 (1881). 
 390 See generally Brailsford I, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 404–405 (1792); Brailsford 
II, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415, 418–19 (1793) (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
 391 See generally Maxfield’s Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 330, 332–33, 
335, 16 F. Cas. 1195 (C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (No. 9,321). 
 392 See, e.g., Higginson v. Mein, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 415, 419–20 (1808). 
 393 See infra Part IV.A. 
 394 See infra Part IV.B. 
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true that even during the era of facilitative equity, federal courts ex-
ercised chancery jurisdiction on their own principles. But it was not 
a conscious assertion of non-statutory jurisdiction, as Marshall 
claimed in Bodley and Brown in 1809. Facilitative federal equity is, 
in short, functionally different from homogeneous federal equity. 
Before 1809, federal equity was not purposed to secure uniformity 
over an ever-increasing territorial expanse. Rather, the federal courts 
actively used equity jurisdiction to practically administer the Judici-
ary Act of 1789 and to secure the footing of the federal judiciary in 
the new constitutional landscape. 
A. The Doctrine 
1. PRESERVING THE STATES’ LEGAL CLAIMS 
In Georgia v. Brailsford, decided in August 1792, federal equity 
facilitated the enforcement of a state statute in a federal trial court.395 
The case is significant not only because it “offered the Justices the 
opportunity to explore for the first time the relation between the law 
and equity sides of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.”396 It also 
showed that Georgia, one of the sovereign components of the nas-
cent federalism, could rely on the Supreme Court’s equity side to 
assist in the enforcement (in federal court) of its own legal rights 
created by its statutes. 
The common law side of the federal Circuit Court for the District 
of Georgia had issued judgment on a 1774 bond.397 Georgia’s appli-
cation to be added as a party in the circuit court, on the basis that the 
debt was subject to the state’s confiscation act, was denied.398 It was 
not an isolated case. In one of its filings, Georgia claimed that in 
many cases the circuit court had issued judgment “for debts within 
the descriptions of the confiscation law, upon the sole principle of 
                                                                                                             
 395 See generally Brailsford I, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 404–05 (1792). 
 396 Maeva Marcus, Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 57, 57 (1996). 
 397 Brailsford I, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 404. 
 398 See John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789-1835, and the History of 
American Judging, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1425, 1443–45 (1998) (observing that Geor-
gia’s attempted interpleader failed because defendant objected to the interpleader 
and because the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over cases where a state 
was a party). 
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debtor and creditor, and without any reference to the right and claim 
of the state.”399 
Possessed of a claimed legal right without a legal remedy in the 
federal courts, Georgia commenced proceedings on the equity side 
of the Supreme Court. The bill prayed for an injunction to stay in 
the hands of the marshal of the circuit court the property levied and 
money raised in execution of the judgment.400 It also requested that 
the Court direct the marshal to pay money raised in execution of 
judgment, and the defendant at law to pay the balance, to the treas-
urer of Georgia—in other words, Georgia asked the equity side of 
the Supreme Court for a decision on the merits of Georgia’s com-
mon law claim.401 Over two dissents, and a subsequent dissolution 
motion, the Supreme Court granted the injunction because “the 
money ought to be kept for the party to whom it belongs.”402 The 
equity side of the Supreme Court did not decide the merits of the 
claim. Rather, the Court, to enable Georgia to pursue its legal right 
to the debt, held that “the money should remain in the custody of the 
law, till the law has adjudged to whom it belongs.”403 Twelve 
months later, when common law proceedings had finished and a jury 
had determined that Georgia was not entitled to the money,404 the 
injunction was, naturally, dissolved.405 
Two aspects of the case will be elaborated later.406 First, the jus-
tices resorted to general equitable principles derived from the Eng-
lish High Court of Chancery. Second, equity was deployed to sup-
port the federal system that was “so new and in many respects un-
aided by [an]y former examples.”407 Georgia turned to federal equity 
to fashion a remedy to vindicate its legal rights in the federal courts. 
                                                                                                             
 399 Brailsford I, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 404 (quoting Georgia’s pleading). 
 400 Id. at 404–05. 
 401 Id. 
 402 Brailsford II, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 418–19 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
 403 Brailsford I, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
 404 See Georgia v. Brailsford (Brailsford III), 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 5 (1794). 
 405 Brailsford II, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419 n.*; Brailsford I, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 
409 n.*. 
 406 See infra Part IV.B.2.a. 
 407 Letter from James Iredell to George Washington (Feb. 23, 1792), in 2 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–
1800: THE JUSTICES ON CIRCUIT 1790–1794, at 239, 240 (Maeva Marcus ed., 
1988) [hereinafter James Iredell to George Washington]. 
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2. LIMITING FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION 
The second circumstance where the early federal courts used eq-
uity to legitimize their processes was the prevention of the fraudu-
lent manufacture of diversity jurisdiction. In Maxfield’s Lessee v. 
Levy,408 the plaintiff, a Delaware citizen, had brought seventy eject-
ment actions in the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania.409 
The defendants filed a bill for discovery on the equity side of the 
federal court.410 The discovery (which was competent evidence in 
the common law ejectment proceedings) disclosed that the land, lo-
cated in Pennsylvania, had been conveyed to the plaintiff for no con-
sideration by a Pennsylvania citizen, for the sole purpose of making 
the plaintiff the nominal lessor to ground diversity jurisdiction.411 
Riding circuit, Justice Iredell dismissed all seventy ejectment 
suits in an opinion he thought “very important,”412 because “it con-
cerns the constitution and laws of the United States, in a point highly 
essential to their welfare, to wit, the proper boundaries between the 
authority of a single state, and that of the United States.”413 Iredell 
was not happy at the prospect of the circuit court’s diversity juris-
diction being fraudulently manufactured. A party, he said, “must as-
sign a good reason for coming here.”414 With these federalism con-
cerns front-and-center, Iredell fumed that “[t]here is not the least 
shadow of evidence” that the land had been conveyed in good 
faith.415 He thundered: 
When the constitution has guarded, with the utmost 
solicitude, against the exercise of a particular author-
ity, so as that, under certain circumstances, one man 
                                                                                                             
 408 See Maxfield’s Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 330, 16 F. Cas. 1195  
(C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (No. 9,321). 
 409 Letter from James Iredell to Hannah Iredell (Apr. 21, 1797), in 3 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–
1800: THE JUSTICES ON CIRCUIT 1795–1800, at 170, 170 n.1 (Maeva Marcus ed., 
1990) [hereinafter James Iredell to Hannah Iredell]. 
 410 See Maxfield, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 330. 
 411 See id. at 331–35; James Iredell to Hannah Iredell, supra note 409, at 170 
n.1. 
 412 James Iredell to Hannah Iredell, supra note 409, at 170. 
 413 Maxfield, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 330. 
 414 Id. at 332. 
 415 Id. at 333. 
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shall not sue another in a Court created under it, can 
such a Court for a moment support a doctrine, that it 
shall be in the power of such a man, by any contriv-
ance expressly calculated to defeat this object, to 
render it wholly nugatory? This, indeed, would be to 
render the laws of our country a farce; to make the 
constitution a mere shadow; and deservedly to draw 
upon those entrusted with its execution, an odium 
which has been industriously, but, I hope, will ever 
be in vain attempted.416 
Iredell therefore dismissed the suits because the plaintiff “only per-
mits his name to be used, for the support of a fraud on the jurisdic-
tion of the Court.”417 Although acknowledging that he could not 
award costs, Iredell added for good measure that if it was in his 
power, he would have ordered double costs.418 
As elaborated below, Iredell used equity to guard federal juris-
diction.419 If the court only had the ejectment pleadings, without the 
benefit of the bill of discovery, then that “would leave the constitu-
tion, and the law . . . open to certain evasion.”420 Here, “the aid of 
equity” ensured “that the Court be not made . . . an usurper of juris-
diction not belonging to it.”421 Iredell made the case about the fed-
eral structure, denying relief to preserve “the proper boundaries be-
tween the authority of a single state, and that of the United 
States.”422 And even if judgment had been entered by the common 
law court, “equity might properly grant an injunction, to prevent a 
party availing himself of his own fraud.”423 
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 417 Id. at 334–35. 
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3. FOLLOWING STATE LAW 
a. State Statutes 
Although the Rules of Decision Act did not apply to equity suits, 
early federal courts sitting in equity carefully applied state statutes. 
For example, as discussed above, in 1792 the equity side of the Su-
preme Court—in the absence of a writ of error and at the application 
of a state (a third party)—restrained a federal court from executing 
a judgment at law when that state’s statute had not been applied.424 
In 1805, the equity side of the Supreme Court adopted “the construc-
tion given by the courts of Georgia to the statute.”425 The equity side 
of the lower federal courts also diligently enforced state statutes ac-
cording to their terms.426 Even when the equity side of a federal 
court did not apply a state statute, the court seemed to base its con-
clusion on a faithful interpretation of the statutory language rather 
than the application of freestanding equitable doctrine.427 
One variety of state statute is of particular interest. The early 
federal courts uniformly applied state statutes of limitations. This 
may have been established as early as 1806 in Hopkirk v. Bell.428 
The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that Virginia’s act of lim-
itations was no bar, but only because the statute was nullified by the 
Treaty of Paris.429 But for the interposition of the treaty, the state 
statute of limitations would have barred plaintiff’s federal equity 
                                                                                                             
 424 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 425 Telfair v. Stead’s Ex’rs, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 407, 418 (1805) (“We have re-
ceived information as to the construction given by the courts of Georgia to the 
statute of 5 Geo. 2 making lands in the colonies liable for debts, and are satisfied 
that they are considered as chargeable without making the heir a party.”). 
 426 See, e.g., Thompson v. Jamesson, 23 F. Cas. 1051, 1052 (C.C.D.C. 1806) 
(No. 13,960) (applying the statute of frauds) (“A court of equity cannot, more than 
a court of law, dispense with the positive and clear prohibition of a statute.”). 
 427 See, e.g., Ray v. Law, 20 F. Cas. 329, 330 (C.C.D.C. 1806) (No. 11,591) 
(“THE COURT, on considering the acts of Maryland on that subject, were of opin-
ion that they did not apply to the court of chancery.”). 
 428 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454, 456–58 (1806). 
 429 Id. at 458. 
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suit.430 In general, the circuit courts followed state statutes of limi-
tations.431 And in at least one equity case, the Supreme Court 
adopted the state court interpretation of its limitation statute, even 
though the Court thought that the interpretation was contrary to the 
text.432 It was a different story once the notion of homogeneous fed-
eral equity took root. Some federal equity courts considered state 
statutes of limitation binding;433 other federal courts thought the 
statutes relevant to the equitable doctrine of laches;434 still others 
held that they were free from the statute altogether.435 It was this 
precise controversy that kicked off Guaranty Trust. 
b. When State Common Law Courts “Equitise” 
Before 1809, the federal courts vigilantly applied the Rules of 
Decision Act even if it meant changing the boundary between law 
and equity in federal court. A line of cases from Pennsylvania con-
fronted the “strange mixture of legal and equitable powers, in the 
Courts of law of this state,” which “arises from the want of a distinct 
forum to exercise chancery jurisdiction; and, therefore, the common 
                                                                                                             
 430 The Circuit Court for the District of Virginia, sitting in equity, certified to 
the Supreme Court the question “[w]hether the act of assembly of Virginia for the 
limitation of actions pleaded by the defendant was, under all the circumstances 
stated, a bar to the plaintiff’s demand founded on a promissory note given on the 
21st day of August, 1773?” Id. at 454. The Virginia limitations period for equity 
suits seeking an account was five years from the date the cause of action accrued. 
Id. at 456. Payees were British subjects and the Treaty of Paris provided “that 
creditors on either side, shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of 
the full value, in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.” Id. 
at 455. The Court held that the plaintiff’s demand on the note was not barred by 
the statute of limitations. “[T]he length of time from the giving the note to the 
commencement of the war” was “not . . . sufficient to bar the demand on the said 
note, according to the said act of assembly” because “the treaty . . . does not admit 
of adding the time previous to the war, to any time subsequent to the treaty, in 
order to make a bar.” Id. at 458. In other words, the Treaty of Paris removed the 
“lawful impediment”—the statute of limitations. Id. at 455. 
 431 See GOEBEL, supra note 91, at 588 n.167. 
 432 Higginson v. Mein, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 415, 419–20 (1808). 
 433 See, e.g., Pulliam v. Pulliam, 10 F. 53, 76–78 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1881). 
 434 See, e.g., Alsop v. Riker, 155 U.S. 448, 460–61 (1894); see also Halstead 
v. Grinnan, 152 U.S. 412, 416–17 (1894); Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 
503, 560–61 (1846). 
 435 See, e.g., Johnston v. Roe, 1 F. 692, 695 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1880); Kirby v. 
Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co., 120 U.S. 130, 137–38 (1887). 
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law Courts equitise as far as possible.”436 The federal courts—rather 
than assert that the distinction between law and equity in federal 
court could not be altered by the states (as was customary after 
1809)—deferred and sat as mirror images of the state common law 
courts, “equitis[ing] as far as possible.”437 
In 1799, the Supreme Court followed Pennsylvania’s classifica-
tion of legal and equitable rights to land. In Sims’ Lessee v. Irvine, 
the Court’s paramount concern was adherence to local law for fear 
of upsetting land titles.438 Plaintiff grounded his ejectment on money 
paid, a warrant, and a survey, but no patent.439 Ordinarily, this vested 
only equitable title to land and was therefore insufficient for a com-
mon law ejectment suit.440 But in Pennsylvania, “whether from a 
defect of Chancery powers, or for other reasons of policy or justice,” 
it vested legal title.441 Invoking the Rules of Decision Act, Chief 
Justice Ellsworth held that the “established legal right . . . with prop-
erty and tenures . . . remains a legal right notwithstanding any new 
distribution of judicial powers.”442 Iredell concurred because the 
rule, “having been the ground of many titles, it would be improper 
in the Court to shake it.”443 But he took the opportunity to issue a 
paean to the law/equity distinction, and he cautioned federal judges 
against deviating from “legal strictness” “when the want of a Court 
of equity may urge them to procure substantial justice.”444 
Similarly, deciding an ejectment suit while riding circuit in 
1806, Justice Washington administered equity through the common 
                                                                                                             
 436 Hollingsworth v. Fry, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 345, 348, 12 F. Cas. 378 (C.C.D. Pa. 
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law exactly like a Pennsylvania court.445 In his charge to the jury, 
Washington observed that defendant “must show a better title, either 
legal or equitable,” and—in case anyone missed it— “[w]hen I say 
equitable, I speak in reference to the laws and usages of this 
state.”446 Any equitable title “must be such as a court of equity 
would sustain.”447 Washington then applied “[t]he rule in this state 
. . . that if a man, having a warrant, do not use due diligence to sur-
vey it, so as to afford notice to others, he loses his priority.”448 Citing 
Fonblanque’s equity treatise, the justice asked: “[w]hat kind of fig-
ure would this defendant make in a court of equity, with his dormant 
title, against a fair bona fide purchaser, without notice, and shielded 
by a legal title?”449 
By 1811—notably, after Bodley and Brown—Washington had 
changed course, or at least applied a different rule when land titles 
were not at issue. Riding circuit in Jordan v. Wilkins, he refused to 
adopt the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s conscious equitable lib-
eralization of the common law action of account.450 The plaintiff 
brought an action at law against one of his partners alleging that the 
defendant withheld money received from named third parties that 
belonged to the plaintiff.451 The evidence, however, showed that the 
defendant received the money from a third party whom the plaintiff 
had not named.452 This would usually justify dismissal because the 
common law required that the defendant receive money only from 
the third parties named in the pleadings.453 But in 1788, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court relaxed that requirement, observing that 
“we have no Court of Chancery to interpose an equitable jurisdic-
tion.”454 Washington would have none of it. The state court’s expan-
sion of the action of account was “in consequence of the want of 
                                                                                                             
 445 See Gordon v. Kerr, 10 F. Cas. 801, 802 (Washington, Circuit Justice, 
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chancery jurisdiction in the state.”455 But “[t]his court has chancery 
jurisdiction.”456 The action was dismissed.457 
It appears, however, that on evidentiary issues not affecting land 
title, federal judges at common law disregarded the “strange mixture 
of legal and equitable powers” in the Pennsylvania courts—even if 
it meant divergent outcomes.458 In O’Harra v. Hall, the assignor of 
a bond objected at trial to the assignee’s attempt to offer parol evi-
dence showing that the assignor had guaranteed payment of the 
bond.459 The assignee had invoked the equitable principle allowing 
parol evidence to prove misrepresentation, and cited a Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court case holding that “parol evidence was proper to be 
admitted” in a common law action for ejectment to show “a breach 
of trust.”460 The federal court was unmoved. The district judge ob-
served that the result would have been different had plaintiff brought 
the action in state court: 
If we were sitting as Judges in a state Court, I should 
be inclined to admit the testimony, in order to attain 
the real justice of the cause; as there is no Court of 
equity in Pennsylvania. But there is no such defect in 
the federal jurisdiction; and, therefore, when the 
party comes to the common law side of the Court, he 
must be content with the strict common law rule of 
evidence.461 
Justice Chase, riding circuit, agreed. He said that although “chan-
cery will not confine itself to the strict rule . . . we are sitting as 
Judges at common-law.”462 
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The equity side of the Pennsylvania federal court, although not 
bound by the express terms of the Rules of Decision Act, similarly 
took notice of state merger. Riding circuit in 1800, Justice Paterson 
effectively held that a failure to put equitable arguments to the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court had waived those arguments on the equity 
side of the federal court.463 Plaintiff’s failure, in the earlier state 
court action, to apprise that court of the equity of its case contributed 
to Paterson’s dismissal, for laches, of the bill filed in federal court.464 
Hollingsworth centered on an agreement executed in 1790 provid-
ing that if, by a date certain in 1791, plaintiff had not paid defendant 
money to which defendant was entitled by reason of improvements 
to land, then the defendant would hold the land free from plaintiff’s 
claims. 465 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania gave judgment in 
July 1791 for defendant.466 Years later, plaintiff filed a bill on the 
equity side of federal court, alleging fraud by defendant and request-
ing a perpetual injunction against all proceedings on the state court 
judgment.467 
Interestingly, Paterson did not refer to the delicate issue of plain-
tiff’s request for a federal injunction arresting a state common law 
judgment. Instead he dismissed the bill for laches.468 Time was of 
the essence in the 1790 contract, and even if it were not, plaintiff 
“comes too late to avail himself . . . . The door of equity cannot re-
main open for ever.”469 Paterson observed that “[t]here is a strange 
mixture of legal and equitable powers, in the Courts of law of this 
state,” which “arises from the want of a distinct forum to exercise 
chancery jurisdiction; and, therefore, the common law Courts equi-
tise as far as possible.”470 It was unnecessary to determine whether 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would have extended relief to 
the plaintiff, because plaintiff should “have laid the equity of the 
case before the judges of that Court” when he was on notice of entry 
of judgment. 471 Plaintiff “did not avail himself of an appeal to the 
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discretion of the Court; but suffered judgment to pass against him, 
without making any objection.”472 
B. The Motivation 
Just as homogeneous federal equity served to maintain the insti-
tutional coherence of the federal courts during westward continental 
expansion, and heterogeneous federal equity served to consolidate 
Progressive values in the aftermath of the New Deal, the facilitative 
conception of federal equity served larger goals. Equity functioned 
as a useful tool to administer the Judiciary Act of 1789, and it con-
tributed to the construction of the early American state. 
1. EQUITY AND ADMINISTRATION 
Recent scholarship illustrates that equity’s facilitative character 
explains its capacity for performing administrative tasks.473 Taking 
a wide view of administration, Turner notes a variety of administra-
tive tasks, “from the administration of the assets of trusts, through 
the administration of insolvent estates and of solvent and insolvent 
business associations, and to the administration of the affairs of the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches of government.”474 Eq-
uity administers a legislative scheme, for example, by “keep[ing] a 
responsible person to the performance of his or her obligations under 
the scheme.”475 And, when the common law or statute runs out, eq-
uity can provide a lawful foundation for administrative tasks.476 In 
enforcing a trust, “equity gives effect to deliberately established re-
gimes for the management of assets” when common law and statute 
do not.477 Sometimes these features (administering a legislative 
scheme and providing a lawful foundation for administrative tasks) 
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AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 29, at 2–3, 33. It is unconventional, perhaps 
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 476 See id. at 2–3, 19. 
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combine. Equity’s imposition of fiduciary obligations on company 
directors arose as an aspect of the administration of early corpora-
tions legislation.478 Courts of equity provided a lawful basis to im-
pose fiduciary obligations on company directors “by reason of the 
similarity between their position of control over the company and 
its assets and the positions held by trustees and agents.”479 
The early federal courts enlisted equity to administer the first 
Judiciary Act. The statute was an ex ante mode of regulation; and it 
is, of course, impossible to specify in advance the infinite variety of 
opportunistic behavior that will exploit statutory loopholes.480 Eq-
uity’s ex post perspective was necessary to ensure that the legislative 
scheme worked in a commonsense way. In Brailsford, for example, 
the strict application of the common law prevented Georgia from 
interpleading in the circuit court to press its legal claim.481 On the 
equity side of the Supreme Court, Georgia alleged that the parties 
had conspired not to appeal, thereby frustrating Georgia’s claim482 
(until 1875 the lower federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear suits 
brought by States).483 Equity provided a lawful foundation to halt 
execution of judgment so that Georgia’s legal entitlement to the debt 
could be finally decided. The injunction thwarted an untenable situ-
ation where a state could not enforce its statute in federal court. Sim-
ilarly, in Maxfield, equity neutralized the opportunistic manufacture 
of diversity jurisdiction.484 It enforced the statutory policy that fed-
eral court jurisdiction is limited and should not be guilefully en-
larged. 
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 480 See generally Smith, supra note 55, at 175–76, 180–81, 184. 
 481 James Iredell to George Washington, supra note 407, at 241–42. 
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2. NATION BUILDING 
In his seminal work on the construction of American statehood, 
Stephen Skowronek recounted that in the eyes of Tocqueville, He-
gel, and Marx, the nineteenth-century U.S. governmental order 
“failed to evoke the sense of a state.”485 This “distinctive sense of 
statelessness” was generated by the location of substantive govern-
ment in the several states.486 The federal government was compara-
tively weak and it assumed the absence of strong national institu-
tions.487 The federal institutions that penetrated the territory were 
“land offices, post offices, and customhouses,” “illustrat[ing] the 
orientation toward basic services that routinely dominated federal 
concerns.”488 The majority of law, too, was state-centric: “[o]ne 
finds the most fundamental social choices—from the organization 
of capitalism to the regulation of family life—firmly lodged in state 
legal codes.”489 
The diffusion of governmental power across far-flung territory 
posed obvious problems for the early federal nation, which Skow-
ronek argues were solved by “the cohesive procedures of courts and 
parties.”490 The federal courts in the nineteenth century made sense 
of the untested constitutional order, and the Supreme Court emerged 
in the 1790s as an important player in the resolution of federal-state 
disputes.491 Plainly the fallout from Chisholm v. Georgia492 looms 
large, and the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment as a “stunning 
rebuke to Jay and the Court” has dominated scholarly attention.493 
In holding that the Constitution stripped state sovereign immunity 
                                                                                                             
 485 SKOWRONEK, supra note 28, at 8. 
 486 Id. at 23. 
 487 Id. 
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 491 See JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT AS FINAL ARBITER IN 
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from suit in federal court, Chisholm played into antifederalist fears 
and positioned the states in opposition to the federal government.494 
a. Preserving the States’ Legal Claims 
Chisholm describes a conflict model of federal-state relations, 
and the Supreme Court’s interjection was a roaring failure. By con-
trast, in Brailsford, the Supreme Court deployed the flexibility of 
equity to enable the state to vindicate its legal rights in federal court. 
In an era when the procedure of the Supreme Court had not been 
liquidated through practice, equity proved a vital tool to maintain 
institutional coherence.495 In February 1792, before the case was ar-
gued in the Supreme Court, Justice Iredell wrote President Wash-
ington that Georgia’s inability to press its claim in the circuit court 
constituted a “circumstance of great importance” and “of the highest 
moment,” arising “under a system without precedent in the history 
of Mankind.”496 And it is hard to imagine the federal judiciary—
with “only a few judges, fledgling courts (some of which lacked reg-
ular judges altogether), and precious little else”—maintaining (let 
alone consolidating) authority if the states could not sue there on 
their own statutes.497  
The statute at issue, Georgia’s sequestration statute, was partic-
ularly contested.498 The Treaty of Paris required payment of prewar 
debts to British creditors, but recovery in state court was difficult 
                                                                                                             
 494 See generally Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 495 See 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
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due to the proliferation of confiscation and sequestration statutes.499 
It is hardly surprising that the Augusta Chronicle expressly 
acknowledged that the injunction issued by the Supreme Court 
strengthened the institutional integrity of the federal courts and the 
stability of the federal government itself: 
It must be acknowledged that this decision reflects 
great honor on the four [sic three] Judges who ac-
corded therein. It not only wears a republican feature, 
as maintaining the legal rights of individual states, 
but must tend to the stability of the general govern-
ment itself from its impartial tenor.500 
It is noteworthy too that Jefferson used the “integrity” of the circuit 
court opinion in Brailsford (refusing to let Georgia interplead) to 
counter British allegations that the United States had violated the 
Treaty of Paris.501 
The Supreme Court’s equity side showed how flexible the fed-
eral judiciary could be. The Court went to surprising lengths to hear 
Georgia’s legal claim in Brailsford. First, the very fact that the in-
junction was granted demonstrates awareness of the English doc-
trine permitting courts of equity to stay money in the hands of the 
sheriff even after execution of a judgment at law.502 This species of 
injunction was relatively novel, originating under Lord Thurlow.503 
                                                                                                             
 499 See Lochlan F. Shelfer, Note, Special Juries in the Supreme Court, 123 
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Second, once the injunction to stay execution issued, the Court had 
a choice: it could assert equitable jurisdiction over the entire cause 
to decide the substantive merits of Georgia’s claim, or it could re-
linquish substantive jurisdiction to the common law side for a merits 
decision. Importantly, if the Court had opted to retain its equitable 
jurisdiction, that would not have precluded a jury trial. The Court’s 
equity side could direct an issue to be tried by a jury at common law; 
traditionally, however, the Chancellor was not bound by trials or 
opinions on issues he had remitted to common law.504 In dissent, 
Justices Iredell and Blair favored this approach.505 The Court instead 
opted to relinquish its equitable jurisdiction over the substance of 
Georgia’s claim.506 Georgia then filed an action on the common law 
side of the Supreme Court, and a jury was convened for a final de-
cision.507 In the end, the jury found against Georgia;508 but the Court 
had mobilized equity to preserve Georgia’s right to have its legal 
claims adjudicated at law by an authoritative, final, and binding jury 
verdict. The Court “signaled its desire both to limit the equity juris-
diction of the Court and to have the substantive question tried by a 
jury,” and “it appears to have been of great importance to the Court 
at this early moment in its history to begin to define the boundaries 
between its law and equity jurisdictions in accordance with the lan-
guage of the Judiciary Act of 1789.”509 Equity’s flexibility facili-
tated the conclusive determination of Georgia’s legal rights in fed-
eral court. 
Scholars have focused on the Brailsford Court’s impaneling of 
a jury and Jay’s apparently odd instruction that the jury should make 
findings of law (the facts were stipulated).510 Riding circuit in 1851, 
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Justice Curtis said that “the whole case is an anomaly,” because “[i]t 
purports to be a trial by jury in the supreme court of the United 
States, of certain issues out of chancery,” and “the chief justice be-
gins by telling the jury that the facts are all agreed, and the only 
question is a matter of law, and upon that the whole court were 
agreed.”511 Recent work suggests that Curtis’s confusion arises from 
the nature of the jury impaneled: a special jury of merchants having 
power to decide mercantile custom, which was incorporated into the 
common law.512 Focusing on the equity side in Brailsford points up 
another source of Curtis’s confusion. The case was not “a trial by 
jury . . . of certain issues out of chancery.”513 The issues were not 
directed out of the Court’s equity side; the Court refused to assume 
equitable jurisdiction over Georgia’s substantive claim.514 The mer-
its of that claim were decided in an independent common law action 
on the case, the law decided by a special jury of merchants. 
b. Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction 
Despite characterizing the early American state as one of courts 
and parties, Skowronek nevertheless maintained that the early fed-
eral courts “imparted an evanescent or elusive quality” that rein-
forced an impression of statelessness.515 Circuit riding, so arduous 
and expensive for the justices, was intended to “meet every Citizen 
in his own State,” and to “carry Law to their Homes, Courts to their 
Doors.”516 In widely published grand jury charges, the justices in-
troduced the citizenry to the political principles of the new country, 
including those of the national judicial power.517 At the same time, 
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the federal courts were the junior partner in the administration of 
justice at the turn of the nineteenth century. The first Judiciary Act 
“created circuit courts but no circuit judges”: the designated Su-
preme Court justice rode into town and soon rode out, leaving per-
haps an evanescent or elusive impression.518 Most law was en-
sconced in the states and enforced by state courts.519 In trials at com-
mon law, the Rules of Decision Act directed federal court judges to 
apply state law; it was not until 1875 that the federal courts obtained 
general federal question jurisdiction.520 
Armed with national judicial power but weak institutional appa-
ratus, the federal courts were careful not to overreach. There was, 
additionally, the constant antifederalist worry that the federal courts 
“would eventually swallow up the State courts.”521 The combination 
of these institutional and political constraints weighed on the early 
federal judges. Even Justice Iredell, a vocal federalist, simply could 
not countenance the artificial manufacture of diversity jurisdiction 
in Maxfield.522 Federal court jurisdiction had to be affirmatively es-
tablished; Iredell used equity to pierce the common law pleadings 
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and reach the substance of the basis of federal jurisdiction. This he 
did explicitly in service of federalism, to preserve “the proper 
boundaries between the authority of a single state, and that of the 
United States.”523 Iredell thought that his opinion was “very im-
portant,”524 and he asked Dallas to report it in full.525 
Nearly forty years later, Justice Story blasted Maxfield as 
wrongly animated by “an extreme jealousy of the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States, and an extreme solicitude not to interfere 
with the state jurisdiction.”526 John Sergeant, a prominent Supreme 
Court advocate in the first half of the nineteenth century, argued the 
same point to the Court in the late 1840s: 
The case occurred, it will be remembered, as early as 
the year 1797, when the Constitution had been very 
recently made, its institutions were new and untried, 
and they were both regarded with jealousy, as likely 
to encroach upon and swallow up the States. The ju-
diciary, of course, had its full share of the effects of 
this feeling. Experience has shown that it was 
groundless. 527 
The point is not to argue that Maxfield was right or wrong. The 
point is that Iredell used equity to police the boundaries of federal 
jurisdiction. Keeping the early federal courts within their limited ju-
risdiction was crucial to the perceived legitimacy of their decisions; 
and the continuity of the early American state depended on that per-
ceived legitimacy. 
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c. Following State Law 
The practice of early federal courts carefully following state law 
enhanced the national judiciary’s institutional coherence and legiti-
macy. Skowronek observed that “the most fundamental social 
choices” were “firmly lodged in state legal codes.”528 The relatively 
miniscule volume of federal laws was “interstitial in its nature,” en-
acted “against the background of the total corpus juris of the 
states.”529 State law was therefore necessary for the federal courts’ 
institutional coherence. This was no less true for the equity side of 
the federal courts: equity must take cognizance of the law—includ-
ing state legislation pursuant to the Rules of Decision Act530—in or-
der to supplement it. At least before 1809, the federal courts’ vigi-
lant application of state statutes, including statutes of limitation, 
contributed to the “organizational orientation” of the federal judici-
ary toward the states.531 Similarly, the federal courts’ application of 
state law was necessary for their institutional legitimacy. The Rules 
of Decision Act embodied an important antifederalist principle.532 
The strength of that imperative is evident from the federal court 
opinions coming out of Pennsylvania before 1809. Federal courts 
generally interpreted the Rules of Decision Act as overriding the 
federal distinction between law and equity. In 1806, for example, 
Justice Washington demonstrated the federal judiciary’s institu-
tional malleability by administering equity on the common law side 
of the federal court, sitting, in effect, exactly like another court of 
the state.533 But in 1811, after Bodley and Brown had spoken of 
chancery courts exercising jurisdiction on their own principles, 
Washington reversed course, refusing to apply the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court’s equitable liberalization of the common law action of 
account.534 
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V. EQUITABLE REMEDIAL RIGHTS TODAY: THE PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
In Guaranty Trust, Frankfurter reassured us that there was life 
in the old equitable dog yet. Federal courts retained the authority to 
“afford an equitable remedy for a substantive right recognized by a 
State even though a State court cannot give it.”535 Frankfurter’s 
vague and tepid commitment to the equitable remedial rights doc-
trine begged plenty of questions. It “is difficult to square with the 
basic principle of limited federal judicial authority set out in the re-
mainder of the opinion.”536 It “flatly contradicted the outcome de-
termination principle”537 because it refused to acknowledge that a 
“state-defined substantive right and the remedy given for its en-
forcement may be so closely related that to enforce a different right 
would change the ‘outcome’ significantly.”538 It left unanswered 
whether “the federal court [may] grant specific performance or an 
injunction where only money damages are available in state 
courts.”539 Indeed, Frankfurter’s “use of the remedial rights doctrine 
seems more for rhetorical emphasis than as a reaffirmance of the 
doctrine itself.”540 In the decade following Guaranty Trust, the opin-
ion’s “proper interpretation . . . [wa]s little aided by subsequent de-
cisions.”541 By 1958, a Harvard Law Review note was ambivalent 
on whether the equitable remedial rights doctrine still had force.542 
Today, the scope and application of the “equitable remedial 
rights doctrine” remains mired in confusion. In 2010, a district court 
in Maine observed that “[w]hether federal courts sitting in diversity 
are bound by state limits on equitable remedies is a matter of some 
dispute.”543 Nowhere is the confusion on more painful display than 
when litigants seek preliminary injunctions in diversity actions. This 
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Part outlines the confusion about preliminary injunctions and, draw-
ing on the facilitative conception of federal equity, proposes a sys-
tem of shifting presumptions to ameliorate it. 
A. The Malady 
Federal courts today are still grappling with the internal incoher-
ence of Guaranty Trust. On the one hand, Frankfurter attempted to 
destroy the federal diversity court’s decisional independence by 
placing it as “in effect, only another court of the State.”544 On the 
other hand, he seemingly preserved the federal diversity court’s de-
cisional independence by saying that it can “afford an equitable rem-
edy for a substantive right recognized by a State even though a State 
court cannot give it.”545 There may be a direct line from this overt 
contradiction to the federal courts’ confusion over preliminary in-
junctions.546 
Federal courts have split for decades on whether state or federal 
law should govern the availability of preliminary injunctions in di-
versity actions.547 To some, it is natural that federal law should gov-
ern. The interlocutory injunction merely prevents irreparable injury 
before a decision on the merits, and therefore cannot be outcome 
determinative. Many federal courts have adopted this line of 
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thought,548 including the Second Circuit.549 And this approach has 
pedigree: after all, the Supreme Court in Brailsford, acting on gen-
eral equitable principles, enjoined the execution of a circuit court 
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(applying federal procedure to determine whether the preliminary injunction was 
properly issued); Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Devine, No. 2:15–
cv–328–FtM–29MRM, 2017 WL 3188502, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 25, 2017) (“Fed-
eral law governs the issuance, and dissolution, of a preliminary injunction in a 
diversity action. It is state law, however, that determines whether injunctive relief 
is available for the given state cause of action or remedy.”) (citations omitted); 
Tri-Dam v. Yick, No. 1:11-CV-01301 AWI-SMS, 2016 WL 4061348, at *5 (E.D. 
Cal. July 28, 2016) (stating that federal law applies “in the preliminary injunction 
context”); Clark Equip. Co. v. Armstrong Equip. Co., 431 F.2d 54, 57 (5th Cir. 
1970) (“Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Erie doctrine deprive 
Federal courts in diversity cases of the power to enforce State-created substantive 
rights by well-recognized equitable remedies even though such remedy might not 
be available in the courts of the State.”); Crossno v. Crossno, No. 87–762, 1987 
WL 13080, at *1 (E.D. La. June 18, 1987) (“[P]laintiff is entitled to the equitable 
remedy of [temporary] injunction even though that remedy might not be available 
to a state court litigant.”); Anselmo v. Mull, No. CIV. 2:12–1422 WBS EFB, 2012 
WL 5304799, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2012) (“Courts have held . . . that federal, 
not state, standards govern issuance of a preliminary injunction when a federal 
court is sitting in diversity or exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law 
claims.”); Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 947, 957 (E.D. 
Cal. 1990) (“[F]ederal law provides the standards governing plaintiff’s motion for 
preliminary injunctive relief with respect to . . . her . . . state law claims.”); Irving 
Tr. Co. v. Braswell, 596 F. Supp. 1441, 1443–44 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); U.S. Cable, 
1991 WL 201232, at *2 (“[T]he Tenth Circuit has expressly indicated that federal 
law standards apply in determining whether a preliminary injunction should is-
sue.”) (citing Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Hitz, 905 F.2d 1355, 1361 (10th Cir. 1990)); 
Fed. Leasing, 487 F. Supp. at 1260 (stating that federal law governs the issuance 
of a preliminary injunction in a diversity action), aff’d, 650 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 
1981); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Am. Wholesale Co., 235 F.2d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 1956); 
Cont’l Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 357 n.10 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(quoting Sys. Operations, Inc. v. Sci. Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1141 (3d 
Cir. 1977)); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 470 F. 
Supp. 1308, 1312 (N.D.N.Y. 1979). 
 549 See, e.g., Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. Conn. Packing Co., 732 F.2d 286, 
288 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that a district court sitting in diversity is not per-
mitted “to ignore the federal law requirement that threatened irreparable injury 
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judgment pending determination of Georgia’s common law 
claim.550 But many other federal courts have held precisely the op-
posite: state law should govern the availability of preliminary in-
junctions in diversity litigation.551 Faced with the split, the D.C. Cir-
cuit said that “it is not clear whether the court should look solely to 
the law of . . . the forum for this diversity suit, or whether it is able 
to draw on the independent equity power inherent in the federal 
courts.”552 
If only it were that simple. There are a couple of complicating 
factors. First, federal preliminary injunction requirements can incor-
porate state law. So, for example, federal law requires that the mo-
vant show “a reasonable probability of eventual success in the liti-
gation,” but the notion of “eventual success” can only be determined 
                                                                                                             
must be shown before a preliminary injunction may issue”); Am. Brands, Inc. v. 
Playgirl, Inc., 498 F.2d 947, 949 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 550 See Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunction Standards in Massachusetts 
State and Federal Courts, 35 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 15–17 (2013) (classifying 
Brailsford as involving a preliminary injunction). 
 551 See, e.g., Sims, 863 F.2d at 646; Agnew v. Alicanto, S.A., 125 F.R.D. 355, 
359 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (explaining that New York law governs availability of a 
temporary restraining order in a diversity action.); Am. Gen. Corp., 1982 WL 
1332, at *17 (“[T]he state law governing the right to [preliminary] injunctive relief 
must be applied in diversity cases . . . .”); Hudson Nat’l Bank v. Shapiro, 695 F. 
Supp. 544, 548 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (“This diversity action requires this Court to ap-
ply Florida law in establishing whether or not the movant has established [entitle-
ment to a preliminary injunction.]”); Borman’s, Inc. v. Great Scott Super Mkts., 
Inc., 433 F. Supp. 343, 346 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (“[In a preliminary injunction re-
quest,] it would appear entirely proper for the Court to look to state law to deter-
mine when and whether a showing of irreparable harm must be made.”); First 100, 
LLC v. Omni Fin., LLC, No. 2:16-cv-00099-RFB-CWH, 2016 WL 2980673, at 
*7 (D. Nev. May 23, 2016) (“Where (as here) the Court’s jurisdiction is based on 
diversity of citizenship, the Court must apply state law regarding the availability 
of preliminary injunctive relief rather than federal law if the state law is outcome-
determinative.”); Anglo-Am. Inv. Trust Ltd. v. Pearson, 294 F. Supp. 1150, 1153 
(E.D. Wis. 1969). 
 552 Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 
828 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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by reference to state law.553 Thus, federal preliminary injunction re-
quirements have “both federal and state aspects.”554 Second, some-
times “the outcome is in large part determined at the preliminary 
injunction stage.”555 A preliminary injunction can be “so bound up 
with the substantive rights of the party that an independent federal 
equitable remedy would interfere with the goals of Erie.”556 A dis-
trict court in 1970 argued that “the best approach would be to look 
to state law to determine if a preliminary injunction is permissible,” 
and then “look to federal law to determine whether the court should 
exercise its discretion.”557 
It gets worse. Most courts are careful to distinguish between pre-
liminary and permanent injunctions for the obvious reason that a 
permanent injunction is the conclusive determination of the 
claim.558 At least one district court, however, has erroneously trans-
posed the above mess concerning preliminary injunctions to the per-
                                                                                                             
 553 Sys. Operations, Inc. v. Sci. Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1141 (3d 
Cir. 1977). In the Sixth Circuit, “[w]hile [federal courts] apply [their] own proce-
dural jurisprudence regarding the factors to consider in granting a preliminary in-
junction, [they] apply [State] law to determine whether Plaintiff has met the first 
of these factors by demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success on the merits 
of his underlying diversity action.” Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, 
L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 541 (6th Cir. 2007). The Eighth Circuit uses 
a four-factor federal balancing standard, but looks to state law for each factor. See 
Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. Hennkens, 301 F.3d 931, 935–36 (8th Cir. 2002). See 
also Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 947, 956 (E.D. Cal. 
1990) (“The above analysis is not meant to suggest that state law may not inform 
the court’s exercise of its equitable powers in determining whether preliminary 
injunctive relief is available in a particular case.”). 
 554 Sys. Operations, Inc., 555 F.2d at 1141. 
 555 Sims, 869 F.2d at 647. 
 556 Friends, 746 F.2d at 828 n.18. 
 557 Kaiser Trading Co. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 321 F. Supp. 
923, 931 n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1970). Accord Anselmo v. Mull, No. CIV. 2:12–1422 
WBS EFB, 2012 WL 5304799, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2012) (“In applying the 
federal injunction standard, courts recognize that state law would control on the 
issue of whether a plaintiff is entitled to seek injunctive relief on the claim. After 
concluding that a plaintiff is entitled to seek a preliminary injunction, however, 
courts often rely on the federal standard in exercising their discretion to determine 
whether to grant an injunction.”) (citations omitted). 
 558 See, e.g., Capital Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Maschinenfabrik Herkules, 837 F.2d 
171, 172 (4th Cir. 1988); Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 956; Tri-Dam v. Yick, No. 
1:11-CV-01301 AWI-SMS, 2016 WL 4061348, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 28, 2016). 
2017] OUR EQUITY: FEDERALISM AND CHANCERY 259 
 
manent injunction context, concluding that “even if a permanent in-
junction is permissible under state law, this Court may still exercise 
its discretion to deny the permanent injunction.”559 This is a star-
tling, pre-Erie assertion of independent federal authority to refuse 
final relief that state law would give. 
B. The Tonic 
The existence of facilitative federal equity demonstrates that het-
erogeneity was not a necessary consequence of Erie. Heterogeneous 
and facilitative federal equity are both oriented toward the states. 
Heterogeneity enacted a strong turn to the states by situating the fed-
eral diversity courts as state courts. The orientation of facilitative 
federal equity to the states may be less pronounced, but it was effec-
tive in maintaining the role and status of the states in the early years 
of the Republic, while retaining some decisional independence in 
the federal courts. 
Facilitative federal equity provides a key for resolving the con-
tradiction in Guaranty Trust because it plausibly walked a fine line 
between maintaining a modicum of federal decisional independ-
ence, and being state-regarding. And it walked this fine line by cap-
italizing on equity’s classic distinction between the exclusive juris-
diction (trust enforcement is the usual example) and the jurisdiction 
in aid of legal rights (quia timet injunctions, bills of discovery, bills 
of interpleader, and so on). Facilitative federal equity was state-re-
garding especially when acting in aid of legal rights: Brailsford was 
a preliminary injunction, Maxfield a bill of discovery. 
If preliminary or auxiliary equitable relief in aid of a legal right 
was granted, courts of equity often had to decide whether to take 
jurisdiction over the whole cause of action or to relinquish substan-
tive jurisdiction to the common law. Riding circuit in 1831, Justice 
Baldwin put the problem as follows: 
When the jurisdiction of equity attaches, the extent 
of its exercise depends on the nature and object of the 
suit, if required only as preliminary, or auxiliary to a 
legal remedy, its power ceases when that is effected 
by the aid of equity; a subpoena in equity does not 
                                                                                                             
 559 United Nat’l Maint., Inc. v. San Diego Convention Ctr. Corp., No. 
07cv2172 AJB, 2012 WL 3861946, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2012). 
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. . . draw from law, the cognizance of legal rights or 
legal remedies, when an auxiliary relief alone was 
called for, . . . or be abused as a pretext for bringing 
causes proper for a court of law into equity.560 
If a bill of discovery, for example, “involves the essence and 
merits of the whole case,” then a court of equity would make a final 
decree.561 Similarly, if a contract was made by fraud, and the com-
mon law provided no relief, then the court of equity, “having thus 
possession of the principal question, makes a final decree on the 
question and equity of the whole case.”562 The “plain and intelligi-
ble” rule, said Baldwin, is that if a court of equity takes cognizance 
of “the cause itself,” then it “would not send the party back to law 
to settle [the] incidents.”563 Conversely, “if the incidents only are 
before [the equity court],” then it would not “take the substance of 
the controversy from [common] law.”564 
This provides a useful analogy and guide for a steadier applica-
tion of the equitable remedial rights doctrine. Given the constraints 
of Erie and Guaranty Trust, the doctrine must be limited. Plainly, 
the requested equitable relief cannot involve “the essence and merits 
of the whole case”; otherwise, the doctrine would swallow Erie 
whenever equitable relief is requested.565 To appropriate Baldwin, 
then, the equitable remedial rights doctrine depends on the nature 
and object of the relief requested. It can extend no further than relief 
that facilitates, or is preliminary or auxiliary to, the state-created 
right.566 As with equitable doctrine generally, this is a case-by-case 
inquiry. But it is possible to posit a system of rebuttable presump-
tions that implement the broad principles. 
The default position is commanded by Guaranty Trust: state law 
governs when equitable relief is requested in a federal court enforc-
ing a state right.567 That default presumption can be rebutted only in 
                                                                                                             
 560 Baker v. Biddle, 2 F. Cas. 439, 446 (Baldwin, Circuit Justice, C.C.E.D. Pa. 
1831) (No. 764). 
 561 Id. at 446–47. 
 562 Id. at 447. 
 563 Id. 
 564 Id. 
 565 Id. at 446–47. 
 566 See id. 
 567 Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–10 (1945). 
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limited circumstances: federal standards apply if the requested eq-
uitable relief is preliminary or auxiliary to, or merely facilitates the 
determination of, the state-created right.568 This category of equita-
ble relief is ascertainable and limited.569 It excludes remedies like 
specific performance and defenses like laches, because those touch 
the essence and merits of the state cause of action.570 It includes dis-
covery and other judicial housekeeping matters.571 Generally speak-
ing, it also includes the preliminary injunction, which merely pre-
serves the parties’ relative positions pending a merits decision.572 
Accordingly, if the equitable relief requested is merely preliminary, 
auxiliary, or facilitative, then the presumption arises that federal 
standards govern. That presumption, in turn, can be rebutted if the 
requested equitable relief, although ordinarily preliminary, auxil-
iary, or facilitative, is in all the circumstances functionally equiva-
lent to final relief. 
There is limited force to the obvious counterargument that this 
system of shifting presumptions simply transfers the problem. The 
objection says that rather than debate the scope of the equitable re-
medial rights doctrine, courts will simply debate the vagueness of 
facilitative relief and functional equivalence of final relief. The first 
response is that the system of shifting presumptions neither can nor 
should operate as an algorithm to eradicate vagueness. But more im-
portantly, the set of shifting presumptions ameliorates the vagueness 
problem by structuring the analysis. It implements the proper narrow 
scope of the equitable remedial rights doctrine. Cases have given 
content to the equitable jurisdiction in aid of legal rights; the cate-
gory of preliminary, auxiliary or facilitative relief is relatively de-
terminate. 
Nor do genuine preliminary injunctions implicate the twin aims 
of Erie. This is not to deny that different law governing the availa-
bility of preliminary injunctions in state and federal court may gen-
erate reasons to forum shop. Perhaps genuine preliminary injunc-
tions which do not effect final relief may form the basis of settle-
ment, and plaintiffs will choose the venue where they are more 
                                                                                                             
 568 See Baker, 2 F. Cas. at 446–47. 
 569 See id. at 443–44. 
 570 See id. at 452. 
 571 Past and Present, supra note 14, at 843–45. 
 572 Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). 
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likely to obtain that leverage. (This is a plausible empirical hypoth-
esis.) In the eyes of Erie, however, some forum shopping is more 
equal than others. A plethora of practitioner literature advises 
whether to bring suit in state or federal court; many of these forum-
shopping strategies are beyond Erie’s gaze.573 Erie requires the ap-
plication of the state law of negligence (including contributory neg-
ligence),574 conflict of laws,575 state statutes of limitation and rules 
about tolling,576 the enforceability of contractual arbitration 
clauses,577 state damages caps,578 and the standard of review of jury 
verdicts.579 In other words, Erie requires the application of state law 
that speaks to the existence, nature, or size of ultimate liability as 
deliberated on, and determined by, the federal diversity court. A 
genuine preliminary injunction—issued provisionally on partial or 
scant information and possibly unsatisfactory evidence—does not 
speak to the ultimate issue. Its use by parties as a bargaining chip to 
extract a favorable outcome during settlement negotiations should 
not affect the substantive judicial determination of the state-created 
right. A federal diversity court’s ultimate merits decision should not 
be responsive to a party’s settlement negotiation strategy. 
An appealing counterargument runs as follows: remedies are 
substantive; Erie requires federal diversity courts to apply state sub-
stantive law; therefore, Erie requires federal diversity courts to al-
ways apply state law when deciding whether to give any relief.580 
This would be a perfectly valid syllogism if “substantive” had a 
fixed meaning. But as Frankfurter observed in Guaranty Trust, the 
meaning of “substance” depends on “the particular problem for 
which it is used.”581 To be sure, remedies are substantive because 
                                                                                                             
 573 See, e.g., James J. Dillon & Ericka L. Harper, Countering Plaintiffs’ Juris-
dictions Maneuvers: Forum Shopping for Procedural Advantage, 45 (7) DRI FOR 
THE DEFENSE 50 (2003). 
 574 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69, 72–73, 80 (1938). 
 575 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
 576 Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer 
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533–34 (1949); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 
446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980). 
 577 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956). 
 578 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 430–31 (1996). 
 579 Id. at 439. 
 580 See, e.g., Morley, supra note 358, at 35, 48–51. 
 581 Guar. Tr., 326 U.S. at 108. 
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they give practical content to primary rights and duties.582 But that 
is the start, not the end, of the Erie inquiry. So, for example, the law 
governing permanent injunctions, specific performance, and the 
measure of damages is substantive for Erie purposes. But it does not 
necessarily follow from the existence of state substantive law of pre-
liminary injunctions that Erie requires federal diversity courts to ap-
ply that law. As I have argued, some genuine preliminary injunc-
tions are not outcome-determinative in light of Erie’s twin aims. 
That does not deny that preliminary injunctions are remedially sub-
stantive; it only denies that all preliminary injunctions are substan-
tive for Erie purposes. 
Genuine preliminary injunctions are, for Erie purposes, analo-
gous to a federal diversity court’s inherent power to sanction bad-
faith conduct free of the constraints of state law. In Chambers v. 
NASCO, Inc., Justice White for the Court held that the assessment 
of attorney’s fees as a sanction for bad-faith conduct did not impli-
cate Erie’s twin aims.583 The imposition of sanctions “depends not 
on which party wins the lawsuit, but on how the parties conduct 
themselves during the litigation.”584 And “Erie guarantees a litigant 
that if he takes his state law cause of action to federal court . . . the 
result in his case will be the same as if he had brought it in state 
court,” but “[i]t does not allow him to waste the court’s time and 
resources with cantankerous conduct, even in the unlikely event a 
state court would allow him to do so.”585 Sanctions for conduct dur-
ing litigation did not implicate substantive state policy, but “vindi-
cat[ed] judicial authority.”586 Likewise, genuine preliminary injunc-
tions serve an important function for the vindication of judicial au-
thority. They preserve the subject matter of the dispute to prevent 
the judicial process becoming nugatory. Indeed, “the most compel-
ling reason in favor of entering a Rule 65(a) order is the need to 
                                                                                                             
 582 See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1–3 (4th ed. 2010); Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a 
Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 167 (2008). 
 583 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 52–53 (1991). 
 584 Id. at 53. 
 585 Id. (quoting NASCO, Inc., v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 
696, 706 (5th Cir. 1990)). 
 586 Id. at 55 (quoting NASCO, 894 F.2d at 705). 
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prevent the judicial process from being rendered futile by defend-
ant’s action or refusal to act.”587 A “preliminary injunction is appro-
priate whenever the policy of preserving the court’s power to decide 
the case effectively outweighs the risk of imposing an interim re-
straint before it has done so.”588 In other words, a federal court is 
entitled to apply federal law to protect the integrity of the federal 
judicial process.589 
An example will assist. In Sims Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, the 
Ninth Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction that had enjoined 
snowboarding icon Craig Kelly from using or endorsing any snow-
board other than a Sims, and from using or endorsing any accessory 
products identified as Burton products.590 The district court’s in-
junction was based on an anticipated breach of a personal service 
contract, even though a California statute prohibited state courts 
from issuing such injunctions.591 The Ninth Circuit focused on Cal-
ifornia’s statutory policy, and held that “[t]he general equitable pow-
ers of federal courts should not enable a party suing in diversity to 
obtain an injunction if state law clearly rejects the availability of that 
remedy.”592 The Court observed that “the outcome is in large part 
determined at the preliminary injunction stage,” because “[i]f Kelly 
is enjoined from competing for Burton, Sims has accomplished what 
California has prohibited—the enforcement of a personal service 
contract.”593 
The Sims opinion gestured in the right direction. But it conflated 
two separate issues: whether a preliminary injunction would effect 
final relief, and whether a preliminary injunction would contravene 
California’s statutory policy. The opinion suggested that the prelim-
inary injunction is outcome-determinative because a state court 
could not give it.594 That cannot be true generally: purely procedural 
equitable remedies (for example, discovery) are not outcome-deter-
minative in federal court just because state courts cannot give them. 
                                                                                                             
 587 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 2947 (3d ed. 2017). 
 588 Id. 
 589 See NASCO, 894 F.2d at 705–06. 
 590 Sims Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, 863 F.2d 643, 644, 647 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 591 Id. at 645, 647. 
 592 Id. at 647. 
 593 Id. 
 594 See id. at 646–47. 
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The real question is whether, in all the circumstances of the case, an 
ordinarily facilitative equitable remedy would in fact effect final re-
lief. And this is the question that is ultimately posed by the system 
of shifting presumptions. First, although state law usually governs 
equitable relief when state rights are enforced in federal court, a pre-
liminary injunction is designed merely to preserve the relative posi-
tions of the parties pending a merits determination. Under the equi-
table remedial rights doctrine, federal law governs temporary in-
junctions that prevent irreparable injury pending a decision on the 
merits. But second, in Sims it is contestable whether the district 
court’s preliminary injunction in fact effected final relief. This can-
not be answered by observing that a state court would have no au-
thority to issue such facilitative relief. It can only be answered, in 
classic equitable fashion, by considering all the circumstances of the 
case.595 
CONCLUSION: OUR EQUITY 
This Article has attempted to capture the distinctive course of 
American equity. On one level, it describes the unique strain of 
American equity produced by vesting chancery jurisdiction in a new 
federal judiciary. It is really a tale of three equities. The first, homo-
geneous equity, once exhausted federal equity, but today it operates 
when enforcing federal rights or applying the equitable remedial 
rights doctrine. This equity is strong and expansive, claiming direct 
lineage to the English High Court of Chancery of the eighteenth cen-
tury. Nowhere is the power of this equity clearer than in public law. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the federal courts brought to 
bear the full power of equity in a federalism where the central gov-
                                                                                                             
 595 The facts reported in Sims are insufficient to answer this question. To un-
derstand whether the preliminary injunction is really a permanent one, it would 
be necessary to know the precise terms of the contract. It could be, for example, 
that a brief injunction enjoining Kelly from endorsing a Burton snowboard, with-
out requiring him to endorse a Sims snowboard, would be a satisfactory and tem-
porary way to prevent irreparable injury pending a final merits determination. But 
on the facts reported in Sims, we can only speculate. See generally Sims, 863 F.2d 
at 643. 
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ernment is supreme in the valid exercise of its constitutional author-
ity.596 Indeed, this equity got so strong that abstention doctrines were 
trotted out to limit its power (which, incidentally, parallels the Eng-
lish High Court of Chancery’s cautious use of the common injunc-
tion after vanquishing the common law).597 Justice Black called ab-
stention an example of “Our Federalism,” because it is sensitive to 
the legitimate interests and activities of the states.598 
The second and third conceptions of equity—what we might col-
lectively term Our Equity—are characterized by an important pivot 
towards state law. Until now, this equity was thought to have been 
exhausted by a muscular heterogeneity. Guaranty Trust did not re-
quire that federal equity courts enforcing state-created rights be only 
sensitive to the legitimate interests and activities of the state; it re-
quired that they adopt those legitimate interests and activities for 
themselves. Perhaps Guaranty Trust represents blind deference to 
the states against which Black cautioned. This Article suggests that 
Guaranty Trust introduced a deep tension into the work of federal 
equity courts enforcing state-created rights. But this Article also 
shows that Our Equity need not eliminate as far as constitutionally 
possible the separate identity of the federal equity courts. Indeed, 
there was another conception of federal equity, which I called the 
facilitative conception and which, just like Our Federalism, was 
born in the early struggling days of our Union. It, too, was sensitive 
to the legitimate interests and activities of the state, and did not un-
duly interfere with them. 
On a second level, this Article is about legal doctrine. It attempts 
to provide real guidance to federal courts. If a preliminary injunction 
                                                                                                             
 596 See Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of Appellate 
Review, supra note 191, at 949 (“After Congress created federal question juris-
diction in 1875, federal courts began entertaining bills of equity that sought to 
enjoin allegedly unlawful administrative action. They did so on the theory that 
federal courts needed only a grant of jurisdiction, not a statutory cause of action, 
in order to exercise the powers of a court of equity in ruling on a request to enjoin 
agency action.”) (citations omitted); Monaghan, A Cause of Action, Anyone?, su-
pra note 520, at 1825 n.122 (“When Congress conferred general federal-question 
jurisdiction in 1875 . . . the inclusion of general equity authority resulted in a flood 
of litigation.”); see, e.g., Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 
94, 108, 110–11 (1902). 
 597 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
 598 Id. 
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is an extraordinary remedy, then we should get the governing law 
straight. The conditions of the exercise of a federal diversity court’s 
extraordinary remedial power should be well understood. This is not 
just a preliminary injunction problem, but an equitable remedial 
rights problem. There is, for example, a split on whether state or 
federal law applies to an award of attorney fees. Even though the 
Supreme Court suggested in 1975 that state law should govern,599 
the First Circuit has since said otherwise, at least for federal class 
actions.600 Moreover, this Article is about the role that legal doctrine 
plays to serve political ends or maintain delicate political balances. 
Collins persuasively showed the extent to which Frankfurter was 
motivated by his progressivism.601 Facilitative federal equity was 
animated by a desire to ease, so far as it could, the suspicion with 
which the states viewed the early federal government. In fact, before 
1809, Our Equity played a part in the construction of the United 
States. 
On a third level, this Article raises questions about the nature 
and history of equity. For example, scholarship discussing individ-
ual American colonies can have a “best in show” quality. One 
scholar says that Maryland was different to other colonies because 
it recognized equity at an early date;602 another that equity in South 
Carolina was especially and impressively advanced;603 and another 
that “[t]here can be no doubt that Virginia courts exercised a more 
advanced form of Equity jurisdiction than did the courts in other 
colonies,” including South Carolina.604 A systematic evaluation of 
colonial equity would be fruitful. 
This Article also raises persistent questions about the desirabil-
ity of equity’s preservation in the United States. In Federalist 83, 
                                                                                                             
 599 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 
(1975). 
 600 Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 520, 522 n.5, 522–
23 (1st Cir. 1991); see also In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 
2d 1330, 1362 n.32 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 601 See Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation, supra note 9, at 338; Col-
lins, Government by Injunction, supra note 312, at 351–56. 
 602 See Steiner, supra note 111, at 227. 
 603 See Meriwether, supra note 115, at 71. 
 604 Singleton, supra note 116, at 150. 
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Hamilton saw great advantages to the separation of law and eq-
uity.605 Iredell agreed.606 A minority of contemporary American 
scholars defend the law/equity distinction,607 or at least lament its 
dissolution.608 But the dominant view is for fusion.609 Today the dis-
tinction between law and equity is so antiquated that a prominent 
text on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can assert that “the only 
respect in which the ancient distinctions between law and equity 
have continued to be significant since the merger of the two federal 
civil justice systems in 1938 is with regard to the scope of the jury 
trial right.”610 Douglas Laycock famously argued that “[e]quity is 
ordinary, not extraordinary, in remedies, procedure, and substance,” 
and “[t]he distinctive traditions of equity now pervade the legal sys-
tem.”611 This raises important questions. Should the equitable reme-
dial rights doctrine be preserved at all? Is equity really an enforcea-
ble body of intelligible doctrine? Or is it no more than a space for 
normative discourse, and, if so, is it desirable to preserve that nor-
mative vocabulary? 
 
                                                                                                             
 605 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 505 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961). 
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